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This Article explores the relationship between one typical form of
real estate development finance-the securitized mezzanine loanand one controversial phenomenon-suburban sprawl. It asks
foundational questions about the connection between financial
transactionsand real-worldapplicationsof the capital they raise. In
this work, sprawl serves as an example of an environmental
consequence of applicationsof capital raisedwith a common form of
transaction. This Article considers the extent to which commercial
finance laws release forceful incentives driven by capital markets
upon land use decisions, potentially undermining the collective,
morally informed determinationsuch decisions require. It rejects the
aesthetic aversion to looking beyond transactionalstructures in the
abstract to consider what results as commercial actors use typical
deals to fund typical growth patterns. To the extent that standardized
forms of financial transactionsfund recurring land uses that many
find problematic, the terms and structures of the transactions
themselves should be a subject of critical inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION

debates surround the environmental and cultural desirability
of the sprawling suburbia that characterizes so much American
landscape. This Article explores the extent to which this landscape
is a function of dominant patterns and path dependencies in finance.
"Suburban studies" is an evolved, multidisciplinary project that
engages suburbia as everything from an economic phenomenon to an
architecture, a politics, or a mode of cultural production, to name a
few. While others have observed that suburbanization and debt
finance are intertwined, this Article takes the step of directly relating
contemporary financing practices to land-use results on the ground.
Many environmentalists object to new low-density developments,
especially when the developments consume previously undeveloped
land. Yet, deep mystery surrounds the coexistence of our love of
3
nature and our indifference to its destruction. Home buyers may
have a range of values and objectives that include commitments to
open space yet purchase a new home in a sprawling area in response
to other pressures. Purchasing a new home is not simply an
expression of preference for the house over other values. The age-old
philosophical problem that we simultaneously love and destroy the
natural environment refracts the preferences even of a consumer
committed to an evolved environmental ethic.
Ultimately, this Article considers the extent to which commercial
finance laws release the forces of individual profit motive and capitalmarket-driven incentives upon collective decisions about growth and
development that require delicate, morally informed determination.

I See infra text accompanying notes 86-91, 97-100.
2 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 598
(2006) (reviewing ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY (2005); JOEL
KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2005)); Andrew Reynolds, Disneyfied Sprawl,
Blue-Collar Bogeymen, and Bourgeois Jeremiads: The Legacy of Investment in Suburbia,
56 AM. Q. 1067 (2004) (reviewing DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN
FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH, 1820-2000 (2003); CATHERINE JURCA, WHITE DIASPORA:
THE SUBURB AND THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN NOVEL (2001); SETH M. Low,
BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS

AMERICA (2003)).
3 See generally SHIERRY WEBER NICHOLSEN, THE LOVE OF NATURE AND THE END OF

THE WORLD: THE UNSPOKEN DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN (2002)
(exploring the dimensions of experience with nature that remain unspoken, in an effort to
understand how appreciation of the beauty of nature and indifference to its ruin can
coexist).
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For example, while environmental policies attempt to control rapid
consumption of open-space land,4 commercial finance laws facilitate
real estate developers' capacity to build as many new developments
as fast as the market will. bear.5 Zoning and other local government
measures designed to promote "smart growth," along with
environmental regulation and property devices like the conservation
easement, have attempted to slow the disappearance of open space.6

4 Though definitions of "open-space land" can vary, the concept of open space centers
around natural resources that perform essential ecological functions and provide benefits
to people. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers the following definition:
"Open space includes natural areas such as forests and grasslands, as well as working
farms, ranches, and timberlands. Open space also includes parks, stream and river
corridors, and other natural areas within urban and suburban areas. Open space lands may
be protected or unprotected, public or private." FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
Loss of Open Space, OPEN SPACE CONSERVATION, http://www.fs.fed.us/openspace
/loss space.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). Other jurisdictions may define "open-space"
slightly differently. For example, the State of Virginia defines "open-space land" as
any land which is provided or preserved for (i) park or recreational purposes, (ii)
conservation of land or other natural resources, (iii) historic or scenic purposes,
(iv) assisting in the shaping of the character, direction, and timing of community
development, (v) wetlands as defined in §28.2-1300, or (vi) agricultural and
forestal production.
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1700 (West 2011).
5 The recent slow-down in U.S. housing markets does not change the long-term
population and development projections that threaten open-space land. The USDA
currently reports that "[o]pen space is being lost at an alarming rate-almost 6,000 acres
of open space are converted to developed uses every day." FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., supra note 4. Though not all open-space land is forested, forests comprise a
substantial amount of open space. A recent report by the U.S. Forest Service states that
fifty-six percent of the nation's forests are privately owned, amounting to 420 million
acres; of that number, fifty-seven million acres face a serious threat from housing
development in the next twenty years. See SUSAN M. STEIN ET AL., FOREST SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., GEN. TECHNICAL REP. PNW-GTR-795, PRIVATE FORESTS, PUBLIC
BENEFITS: INCREASED HOUSING DENSITY AND OTHER PRESSURES ON PRIVATE FOREST
CONTRIBUTIONS 3, 13 (2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/openspace/fote/benefits.
html. An August 2010 USDA press release states,
Private forests that play a critical role in supplying our nation with clean water
resources, and the timber we need to build homes and communities across the
country will be threatened. A number of species including the alreadyendangered Florida panther and the grizzly bear are also expected to be put at
risk because of loss of forested land.
Press Release, Forest Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Release No. 0401.10, Vilsack Highlights
Report Showing Threats to Private Forested Lands (Aug. 11, 2010) (on file with author).
6 See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We
Do? Progress Toward SustainableLand Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787 (2007)

(discussing the recent state and local strategies for encouraging growth patterns that do not
aggravate sprawl and its environmental problems). For a discussion of current responses
to persistent problems in land use regulation, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling
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Yet, these efforts swim against a current of capital that responds to
commercial finance law.
The increase in practices like mortgage securitization in recent
decades has coincided with an increase in average home size and in
the number and uniformity of suburban developments.7 That there is
a relationship between financing practices that facilitate home
building and buying, on the one hand, and the issue of suburban
8
sprawl, on the other, seems obvious. But defining this relationship is
remarkably difficult. This Article takes up the challenge.
Sprawl implicates many questions, including the desirability of
open-space consumption. The purpose of this inquiry is not to argue
that suburban sprawl is a problem. Rather, it is to present a
phenomenon that incites intense debate and raises persistent questions
about our relationship to the natural environment, and then to relate
that phenomenon to commercial finance rules that govern the
transactions that fund it.
What is a private-law problem, and what is not? Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) Article 99 facilitates secured debt finance
without regard to whether such finance alleviates or aggravates
environmental concerns. Does secured-transactions law itself escalate

Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1904 (2010)
(reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND

PROPERTY LINES (2009)).
7 See ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE

DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 41 (2000) (stating that "[d]ollar for dollar, no other

society approaches the United States in terms of the number of square feet per person, the
number of baths per bedroom, the number of appliances in the kitchen, [and] the quality of
the climate control"); DOLORES HAYDEN, A FIELD GUIDE TO SPRAWL 110 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Eduardo Penalver, This Could Mean the End of the Exurbs, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, at A13 (stating that the financial crisis may halt continuing
suburbanization of ex-urban areas). For a discussion of "sprawl," see infra Part II.A.
9 U.C.C. § 9 (2005). For a discussion of the scope of Article 9 and the wide range of
transactions it governs, including its relationship to securitization and to real estate
finance, see infra Part I.B. UCC Article 9 governs transactions in which a creditor makes
a loan and takes as collateral a lien on personal property of the debtor. Id. § 9-109. A lien
is a type of property interest. Security interests are liens created by contract-consensual
liens. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), in
conjunction with the American Law Institute (ALI), convenes committees to draft the
UCC. See 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS xv (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed.,
1984). All U.S. states have enacted UCC Article 9. UCC Article 9 Amendments (2010),
UNIFORM

LAW

COMMISSION,

http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC%20

Article%209 %20Amendments%20(2010) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). Unless otherwise
'indicated, citations herein to the UCC are to the official text and comments of the ALl and
NCCUSL.
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certain forms of commercial activity that can aggravate environmental
harms? If so, should the commercial code enact rules with a view
toward the effects of the transactions it governs? Does it already do
this, or does it (and should it) not?
Part I explores the logic of these foundational questions. Part II
then presents a specific context in which one particular form of
secured transaction-the securitized mezzanine loano-funds
developments that contribute to one controversial environmental
outcome: sprawl.
Numerous scholars are looking critically at contemporary forms of
financial transactions to better understand their distributive
implications, capacity for wealth maximization, or tendencies to
create moral hazard. 12 The purpose of this work is not to join the
chorus of critics who call for regulation of financial transactions in
light of recent market failures. Rather, it is to ask foundational
questions about the relationship between the structure of certain types
of financial transactions and the real-world applications of the capital
In particular, the focus here is on environmental
they raise.
consequences of real-world applications of capital raised by
securitized debt finance.13 Suburban sprawl is an example of an
environmental consequence of applications of capital raised with this
type of financing.
Demonstrating a relationship between financing practices and
environmental results raises core questions about the scope and

10 Securitized mezzanine lending has slowed down recently, but facilities and templates
remain in place and the practice will continue. In fact, some commentators identify this
transaction as a way to continue to maximize leverage in real estate development financing
despite mortgage lenders' return to stricter loan-to-value requirements. See infra notes
107-12 and accompanying text. For a description of this transaction, see infra Part II.B.
11Scholars focused on land use policy have discussed sprawl from a variety of vantage
points. The word "sprawl" is pejorative and its meaning is complex, but scholars have
developed several working definitions that capture the kinds of car-dependent, highcarbon-footprint developments that threaten natural resources throughout the United
States. See infra Part II.A.
12 See, e.g., TODD J. ZYWICKI, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY (forthcoming 2011); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind
Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2007);

Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 1759 (2004);
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106. YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Securitization Post-Enron,25 CARDOzO L. REV. 1539 (2004).

13 "Securitized debt finance" refers to loans funded by the proceeds of issuances of
securities that are collateralized with the same or similar loans.
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structure of the private-law rules that comprise commercial finance
law. These rules-primarily property and contract doctrines codified
in the UCC and related statutes--create the commercial finance law
system that provides the basis for practices like securitization.
The objective of this discussion is not to assign liability for
environmental harm to secured lenders. It is to relate environmental
consequences to the financing practices that shape commercial
activity. Specifically, it is to relate securitized structured finance in
real estate development to the phenomenon of suburban sprawl and its
environmental impact.
The houses offered to consumers (who may acquire them with
mortgage products) do not sprout from the ground. Developers build
them with proceeds of secured loans that are very often funded by
securitization facilities. This financing structure can be highly
advantageous for builders, buyers, and financers alike when it lowers
costs of capital for development that provides new housing that meets
buyers' needs. However, this approach to finance can just as readily
be problematic. For example, securitized financing can fund the
building of more homes at a faster pace than communities desire and
the environment can withstand. 14
The modes of finance that fund developers' projects facilitate
developers' potential to build at rates that can outpace collective
decisions regarding open-space preservation. Current modes of real
estate finance permit developers to transfer much of the risk of loss
surrounding new developments to financers.15 There is nothing
inherently wrong with risk transfer; it is a concept at the root of
financial transactions. Risk transfer becomes problematic when it
creates moral hazards that result not just in transferring risk to a

14 Open-space land is a collective asset with important ecological functions. Some
states have begun to quantify the ecological contributions of open spaces by assessing
"ecosystem services." Ecosystem services are the services that natural systems, or
undeveloped areas, contribute to the public welfare. Studies quantify the value of these
services by calculating the replacement cost to the state of services like water filtration or
carbon dioxide absorption that areas like estuaries or forests currently perform. See James
Salzman, CreatingMarkets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 870, 897-99 (2005). Some states have commissioned reports to assess ecosystem
services provided by the various natural resources in the state. See, e.g., ROBERT
CONSTANZA ET AL., GUND INST. FOR ECOLOGICAL EcoN., THE VALUE OF NEW JERSEY'S
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND NATURAL CAPITAL (2006).

15 See infra Part II.B.

366

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 359

financer for a price but also in costs to communities and the

environment.16
When developers use certain common modes of secured debt
financing to undertake new projects, they can transfer risk of the
projects' failure to financers and, ultimately, capital markets. This
Article explores the implications of this reality for communities that
want to control suburban sprawl.' 7
Others have made the connection between secured transactions and
environmental consequences of the activities they fund. Many have
recognized that: (1) environmental harm often results from the
activities of project company subsidiaries-the assets of which are
assigned to a secured lender, and the liabilities of which are separate
from those of its corporate parent; and (2) secured lenders exercise
substantial control over debtors through loan covenants . and
monitoring.' 9

16 The relationship between transfer of risk and externalization of risk is complex.
Parties transfer risk when assets are sold along with attendant risks; in theory the price will
reflect the various risks associated with the assets. Risks are externalized when they are
not priced into transactions, as when private parties create risks that are imposed on the
public. Recent crashes and developments in the financial and housing markets have
generated much public discourse on the subject of externalities of transactions like
subprime mortgages and securitization. This discourse has engaged both risk transfer and
its capacity to create moral hazard, and risk externalization-socialization of loss-that
recent market practices have caused. Many contend that risk transfer through
securitization leads to externalization of risk, and, ultimately, of loss, when the transferred
assets fail. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 12 (discussing effects of securitization
on borrowers and on predatory lending practices); LoPucki, supra note 12 (arguing that
secured lending and securitization enable externalization of costs onto certain classes of
unsecured creditors).
17Some argue that new homes trending upward in size and outward across our
countryside reflect consumer preferences. But the notion that consumer demand for
housing as a commodity should drive land-use policy is problematic. Consumer
preferences are complex. If a larger polity determines that open-space preservation is
important, then the individual preferences of some consumers may not justify land use
policies that produce irreversible consumption of open space.
18 See infra Part I.A.
19 Given these realities, scholars and lawmakers have argued for secured lender liability
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and for priority in advance of secured lenders for environmental claims.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1986). Secured lenders themselves have acknowledged their
role; many project financers have adopted the Equator Principles. The Equator Principles
are standards for secured lending that include a commitment to fund only projects that
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N, THE EQUATOR
meet certain environmental criteria.
PRINCIPLES: A FINANCIAL INDUSTRY BENCHMARK FOR DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND
MANAGING SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN PROJECT FINANCING (2006), available
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Part I moves beyond existing approaches to secured transactions
and environmental impact to challenge the notion that the role of
commercial finance law is to facilitate commercial transactions
without regard for the transactions' environmental effects. 20
After Part I discusses the connection between debt finance and
environmental impact generally, Part II.A describes sprawl and the
controversy surrounding environmental consequences of sprawling
development. Part II puts the questions presented in Part I.B at play
in the context of securitized mezzanine financing for developments
that contribute to suburban sprawl. It seeks to demonstrate a
relationship between contemporary commercial finance practices and
land-use results that many find problematic. "Mezzanine financing"
in this context refers to a secured transaction in which the lender takes
a first-priority security interest in the membership interests of an
entity (usually a limited liability company (LLC) that holds real estate
for the purpose of development).21 A mortgage lender typically holds

Other major
at http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator principles.
institutional lenders have adopted the Carbon Principles--commitments to enhanced
diligence in financings of fossil fuel generation projects. See, e.g., Press Release, Bank of
Am., Bank of America to Announce Adoption of the Carbon Principles at Natural
Resources Defense Council's Tenth Annual Award Event (Apr. 1, 2008) (on file with
author). A secured lender generally is not liable under CERCLA unless the lender controls
activities on the site to such an extent that it is effectively the owner-operator of the
business on the site. See infra Part I.A.
20 A few scholars have argued that the very structure of UCC Article 9 encourages
production without regard to ecology, and is therefore incompatible with environmental
objectives. We can understand these arguments as secured-transactions-law-specific
versions of arguments about environmental harm as a form of market failure more
generally. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The U.C.C.'s Insidious Preferencefor Agronomy
over Ecology in Farm Lending Decisions, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 457 (1993) (arguing that

the unitary security interest and purchase money security interest (PMSI) have aggravated
environmental destruction of American farmland); see also Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of
Commercial Law-Domestic and InternationalImplications, 67 LA. L. REV. 689, 716-23

(2007) (discussing a grid aesthetic in commercial law that puts consideration of
environmental effects of commercial activity out of the purview of the UCC ex ante);
Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 676-77 (2003)
(arguing that devices like carbon trading programs have failed to inspire deliberation over
environmental goals because traditional cost-benefit analyses fail to account for absolute
limits on environmental capacity); infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
21 Note that the term "mezzanine finance" can describe other types of financings (such
as unrated debt or convertible loans) in other industries. The consistent feature in all
mezzanine financings is that they all involve debt that is senior to equity but functionally
junior to some other debt. See Andrew R. Berman, Risks and Realities of Mezzanine
Loans, 72 Mo. L. REV. 993, 998 (2007). In the case of real estate mezzanine financing,
the mezzanine lender's interest is a first-priority or senior interest in the mezzanine loan
collateral, which is distinct in type from the mortgagee's or "senior" lender's collateral.
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a first-priority lien on the real estate itself. The mezzanine lender
holds a first-priority lien on the equity of a special-purpose company
that holds the realty.
Mezzanine financing enables real estate developers to leverage
their projects to a greater degree than is possible with mortgage
financing. Leverage can have the effect of isolating developers from
risk; developers can secure external financing for a project to
maximize their gain if the project succeeds but to protect them from
loss if it fails. Mezzanine lenders, in turn, can shift the risks
associated with their mezzanine loan portfolios to investors by
22
securitizing them.
Mezzanine loans are one prominent form of real estate finance.
The task here is to consider how we might link a given secured
transaction to the environmental consequences of the activities it
funds. Part II re-presents the questions explored in Part I in
transaction-specific terms. For example, how can we say that
mezzanine finance itself escalates certain types of development? And
why focus on mezzanine finance as opposed to monetary policy or
factors altogether apart from finance?
We could say that controversial environmental consequences of
suburban sprawl are a function of mezzanine lending because
securitized mezzanine lending enables real estate development to
outpace the collective processes by which communities should make
decisions about growth. Communities struggle with conflicting goals,
such as the desire to have open space versus the desire. to develop new

The position of the mezzanine lender is distinct from that of a junior mortgage or second
lien. Id.
22 Mezzanine loans are certainly not the only transactions developers can use to raise
capital. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. They may use, for example,
preferred equity financing or junior mortgages. UCC Article 9 treats the membership
interests of an LLC assigned to secure a mezzanine loan like any other LLC membership
interests. (They are general intangibles, unless the members, in the LLC operating
agreement, designate their interests "investment property" within the meaning of Article 8
of the UCC.) U.C.C. §§ 8-103(c), 9-102(a)(42) (2005). Yet, LLCs that hold open-space
land for development are, in an important sense, not like every other LLC. On the one
hand, LLCs engage in countless business activities, all with environmental impact of one
type or another. The LLC entity is just a tool that can be used for any kind of project. An
instrumentalist aesthetic in commercial law informs this view. See Hughes, supra note 20,
at 723-29. On the other hand, special-purpose LLCs formed for development of open
space represent a use of this tool that we can link to controversial uses of land. Examining
one typical form of real estate development finance could potentially enable reform of
private actors' capacities to do environmental harm in the first place.
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neighborhoods to support the tax base and to attract new residents.
These conflicting goals are not just tensions to resolve using costbenefit concepts; they implicate deeper challenges surrounding the
coexistence of attachment to nature and tolerance of destruction. For
example, while communities, institutions, and individuals grapple
with the value and meaning of open space, transactional structures
designed to maximize access to capital for certain modes of building
23
serve up the land for rapid consumption.
The rules of commercial finance contemplate effects of
transactions when presented as fairness or efficiency effects.24 It is
certainly possible to discuss controversial environmental effects of
25
suburban sprawl in terms of efficiency or in terms of fairness. But
.26

23 This Article is an example of what we might call "private environmental law"scholarship that finds private ordering central to the concerns of environmental law. Cf J.
Kevin Healy et al., Environmental Review and Climate Change Adaptation, in THE LAW

OF GREEN BUILDINGS: REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION,
OPERATIONS, AND FINANCING 313, 330 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard eds.,
2010) (arguing for "real estate development to adapt to the new realities of the world with
a changing climate"); Margaret Blair et al., The Roles ofStandardization,Certification and
Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 4 COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON., No. 3, 2008

at 1, 19, 34 (reflecting on the recent proliferation of social and environmental
responsibility standards for global corporations and encouraging the use of "third-party
assurance" which is a "market-based solution based on private ordering" to enforce
environmental standards in global commerce); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber,
ModularEnvironmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 803 (2005) (endorsing a modular

conception of environmental regulation that "expands the universe of players that might be
enlisted in decision making about resource conflict" to include private actors and
stakeholders; Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and
Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10163,

10 173 (2001) (advancing environmental certification programs, which "seek to verify for a
broader public that the activities of certified [private] enterprises are environmentally
appropriate," arguing that such programs "are likely to become important engines of
change in American environmental law," and specifically naming property law as an area
of law in which such programs will have an impact); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New
Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L.

REV 913 (2007) (showing commercial industry leaders leverage contracting power to
impose environmental practices on foreign suppliers); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The
PrivateLife of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005) (expanding the scope of the
regulatory state to include private, "second-order" agreements between commercial
parties, who assume public regulatory roles to better serve their private interests and avoid
market and social sanctions).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 62-63, 65-66.
25 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 20 (discussing ecological economics and how traditional
economic methods do not account for absolute limits on capacities of the natural
environment).
26 For example, environmental impact concerns intergenerational fairness, such as
expressed by the Iroquois practice of testing decisions for effects seven generations
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to the extent that standardized forms of financial transactions fund
recurring land uses that many find problematic, the terms and
structures of the transactions themselves should be a subject of critical
inquiry.
I
DEBT FINANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

The relationship between debt finance and environmental impact is
a function of two concepts that are foundational to commercial
financing transactions: (1) secured lenders' monitoring and directive
power, and (2) limited liability. The monitoring function of secured
lenders can make them effective predictors and mitigators of
environmental harm. At the same time, the common practice of
limiting liability surrounding a project or venture funded by debt
finance-by isolating liabilities to a special-purpose entity, the assets
of which are assigned to lenders-can make lenders the most
immediate financial risk bearers in a commercial undertaking.
Many scholars and practitioners have found that these two facets of
secured lending create a nexus between secured lenders and debtors'
environmental impact.27 Few have taken the step of challenging the
prevailing notion that effects of transactions are not the province of
debt finance law.
Part L.A explains the roles of monitoring and limited liability in
commercial debt finance. Part I.B then moves forward to question the
pervasive idea that commercial finance law need not concern itself
with the environmental effects of applications of capital raised with
secured debt.
Commercial actors use the private-law rules governing secured
debt-most notably UCC Article 9-to enter into transactions with a
wide range of effects, some good and some bad on many different
fronts-social, environmental, psychic, etc.
Demonstrating the
relationship between secured lenders and the environmental

subsequent. Joaggquisho (Oren Lyons), Scanno, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 334 (2010); see
also Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009);
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal EnvironmentalPolicy in an Era ofSelf-Determination: The Role of
Ethics, Economics, and TraditionalEcological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 272-76

(1996).
27 See infra Part I.A.
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consequences of activities they fund requires grappling with several
fundamental questions.
Part LB states and discusses the following questions in turn: First,
how can we say that secured transactions law, primarily UCC Article
9, itself escalates commercial activity and hence its environmental
impact? Second, even if UCC Article 9 does escalate certain forms of
commercial activity, why should the UCC get into the business of
designing rules with a view toward the effects of the transactions it
governs? By what logic are threats to the environment, for example, a

UCC problem?
Environmental concerns are typically the province of regulation.
In recent years, largely in response to climate change, the set of
regulators and regulatory mechanisms has diversified beyond a
28
centralized top-down approach. Depending on one's perspective, to
limit certain forms of development for environmental reasons by
making changes to secured transactions law could be to "regulate" by
Different
means not traditionally associated with regulation.
regulatory subjects enable different degrees and modes of regulation.
A. Secured Lenders, Monitoring,and Limited Liability
An extensive literature discusses the monitoring function of
29
Scholars have focused on monitoring costs in
secured creditors.

28 For example, a majority of U.S. states enact climate change legislation, and numerous
state and local governments and industry organizations have adopted rules and standards
designed to improve environmental sustainability. See Heather Hughes, Enabling
Investment in Environmental Sustainability, 85 IND. L.J. 597, 600-01 nn.19-20, 636
(2010); U.S. States and Regions, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,

http://www.pewelimate.org/states-regions (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (providing a stateby-state survey of this legislation). Some scholars associate this proliferation of regulatory
actors with the federal government's failure to respond to climate change during the Bush
administration. See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get out of the Way: The
States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453,

1471 (2008). Climate change legislation aside, numerous scholars have criticized the topdown, federal-government-driven approach to environmental regulation. For example,
Todd Zywicki has argued that certain special interest groups benefit from the top-down
regime, which permits rent seeking and division of gains among special interest players
and discourages decentralized, market-based alternatives. See Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
EnvironmentalRegulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999).
29 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured
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theories that set out to explain secured transactions. 3 0 Borrowing on a
secured, as opposed to an unsecured, basis entails a variety of costs
Many discussions of the
(including costs of monitoring).3
corresponding benefits of secured credit focus on how secured debt
can reduce agency costs.32 Secured creditors can monitor debtors and
threaten foreclosure on assets if a debtor engages in risk-altering
behavior, underinvests to maximize its own profits at the expense of a
joint venturer, or threatens opportunistic default. 33
For purposes of understanding how the law currently conceives of
the relationship between secured lending and debtors' environmental
impact, it is primarily important to understand that secured creditors
have monitoring and directive power over debtors. Much of the
scholarship referenced above concerns efficiencies and inefficiencies
of secured credit. But regardless of whether secured credit induces
efficiencies through monitoring, the fact that secured lending

Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997); Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in
Creditors'Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806 (2009).

30 As Richard Squire notes, "Although several scholars have argued that the secured
loan promotes creditor monitoring efficiencies, they have disagreed about which creditors
it encourages to monitor." Squire, supra note 29, at 850 (summarizing and contesting
prior monitoring theories); see also F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy PriorityPuzzle, 72 VA.

L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1986) (arguing that secured debt is efficient and that it, paradoxically,
appears to increase monitoring costs); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman,
Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150-51 (1979)

(dismissing creditor monitoring in relation to costs of borrowing and stating that the
existence of collateral is likely to reduce monitoring costs); Levmore, supra.note 29, at
50-59 (arguing that secured credit induces efficient levels of monitoring because it
addresses freeriding considerations); Mann, supra note 29, at 650-51 (investigating
parties' motivations for using secured credit and discussing how collateral narrows the
focus of a creditor's monitoring).
31 These include transaction costs of taking and perfecting a security interest, costs of
monitoring, and opportunity costs to the debtor. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J.

857, 877 (1996).
32 Other theories have proposed that secured credit enables companies to redistribute
value away from non-adjusting and non-consenting creditors, enabling the debtor to obtain
a lower interest rate while externalizing costs onto these unsecured parties. For a summary
of this scholarship, see Hughes, supra note 20, at 712-14; Yair Listokin, Is SecuredDebt
Used to Redistribute Valuefrom Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An EmpiricalAnalysis, 57

DUKE L.J. 1037 (2008) (finding that firms with high tort risk do not issue more secured
debt than other firms, negating the redistribution theory of secured credit). See also
Squire, supra note 29, at 838-42 (stating that debtor opportunism in shifting costs to nonadjusting creditors is the only explanation for the persistence of asymmetrical asset
partitioning).
33 See Listokin, supra note 32, at 1047.
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agreements enable monitoring of debtors puts secured lenders in a
position to anticipate, and potentially control, companies'
environmental impacts.
Secured creditors monitor debtors in a number of ways. They
require debtors to report any events or actions that affect the value of
their collateral or a debtor's ability to repay a loan. They search lien
records. They require debtors to provide statements of compliance
with all loan covenants as a condition to disbursement of funds. They
require debtors to submit periodic financial statements or other
reports evidencing the financial condition of the debtor. Loan
covenants typically include requirements to report any potential
liabilities (including, of course, environmental liabilities).
Loan covenants and monitoring activities are not merely about
reporting the status of the debtor. They are also about enabling
secured lenders to direct a debtor's behavior in situations where a
debtor's activities or external circumstances are jeopardizing a
secured lender's expected return on its investment. Because secured
transactions typically create significant monitoring power with
respect to debtors' activities and assets, they put secured lenders in a
strong position to identify and deter bad behavior.
The concept of debtor misbehavior typically refers to behavior that
alters a lender's risk, such as applying proceeds of a loan in ways the
lender did not anticipate or engaging in misrepresentation or even
fraud. If a debtor creates environmental costs, this could indicate
debtor misbehavior to the extent that these costs result from
unanticipated actions or jeopardize the debtor's ability to pay or the
value of assigned assets.
Many secured lenders use loan covenants to ensure that debtors are
not creating environmental costs in excess of what the parties expect.
For example, if a company seeks to own and operate a manufacturing
facility funded with secured debt, the facility has likely been subject
to an environmental impact assessment. If the debtor creates risk of
environmental liability in excess of what the assessment anticipates,
this will likely constitute an event of default under a loan and security
agreement. The debtor would be obligated by contract to inform its
secured lender of the potential liability.
Nothing obligates a secured lender to respond or to remedy the
situation when a debtor causes this type of event of default. The
questions of whether to call the loan, whether to become involved
with the debtor's affairs, or whether to request more detailed
information are all entirely within the lender's discretion.
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Given the degrees of monitoring power and control over debtors'
behaviors that secured lenders can have, the law contemplates secured
party liability for environmental costs in certain situations.
Specifically, a lender can be liable if its debtor causes environmental
damage that creates liability under the Comprehensive Environmental
34
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), during a
time when the secured lender exercised a degree of control sufficient
to make it an "owner or operator" within the meaning of the statute.s
The idea is that when a debtor pollutes, if that debtor's secured lender
was directing the debtor's activities to a sufficient extent, then
36
liability for clean up extends to the secured lender.

34 CERCLA was enacted originally in 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amended CERCLA on October
17, 1986. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613. The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act
(Brownfields Amendments) amended it further in 2002. Small Business Liability Relief
and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
35 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1}-(4).
36 In addition to liability under CERCLA, secured lenders may also be liable for
hazardous substance cleanup under a state "Superfund" statute. Numerous states have
enacted such statutes, some of which create a lien in favor of the state that takes priority
over security interests. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-451 to 452c (West
2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
147-B:10, 147-B:10-b, (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West 2011). Also,
academics have proposed granting to environmental claimants priority under UCC Article
9. Under these proposals, if a debtor becomes insolvent, environmental claims would be
satisfied out of the debtor's assets before secured lenders' claims are satisfied. See, e.g.,
Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the
Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 822 (1988);
Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who
Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 348 (1990);

LoPucki, supra note 12 (arguing for priority for tort claims generally). Some state
Superfund statutes enact "super liens" that give the government's claim for cleanup costs
priority over secured lenders. Where these liens do arise, they can subordinate a secured
lender's claim to the government's claim. These liens arise only in the specific context of
state Superfund cleanup of contaminated sites. Proposals that legal scholars have made for
tort claim priority or environmental claim priority, in contrast, could apply across contexts
involving tort or environmental liability. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West

2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138
(West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5810-23.11 f(f) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 292.81(3), (4) (West 2011). Jonathan Remy
Nash reports: "[I]n the late 1980s the trend toward proliferation of superlien statutes
subsided... . Some states have repealed their superlien statutes, and only one state has
enacted a superlien statute since the end of 1990." Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental
Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-BackedSecuritization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

127, 131-32 (2002).
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CERCLA created a "Superfund" to enable government cleanup of
contaminated sites and then recover costs from the parties responsible
for the pollution.3 7 CERCLA designates as parties responsible
38
present and past owners or operators of contaminated sites.
The statute reflects the prevailing notion that lenders are not
responsible for effects of debtors' actions. It excludes from the scope
of owner or operator "a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."3
This provision creates, in essence, a security-interest-holder
exemption.
Yet, the statute does not simply exempt secured lenders from
liability altogether. Rather, it requires distinction between situations
in which secured lenders merely hold indicia of ownership versus
situations in which secured lenders participate in management to an
extent sufficient to create liability. CERCLA liability may extend to
secured lenders in two general ways. A secured lender can (1)
become involved in the management of a debtor's affairs such that it
"participates in the management of a vessel or facility" to an extent

37 CERCLA creates strict liability and joint-and-several liability. The EPA may recover
costs from one responsible party, leaving that party to seek contributions from others. See
generally United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990),
(finding a secured creditor subject to CERCLA liability) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(F)(i)(II), as recognized in Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219
(2000); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 560-62 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (finding a bank, which is a secured creditor of a polluted site, could be liable under
CERCLA); Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA:
Sorting out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1187, 1188 (1991) (explaining how,
until recently, federal district courts generally interpreted CERCLA to exempt a lender
from liability unless it was involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility); Susan M.
King, Lenders'Liabilityfor Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241, 266-74 (1988) (discussing

legal risks to lenders under CERCLA); Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpreting the Meaning of
Lender Management ParticipationUnder Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J.

925, 943-44 (1989) (stating reasons why the liability of lenders should be triggered by
activities suggesting ownership).
38 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4). The statute defines "owner or operator" as a range of
parties, including present and past owners, generators of hazardous substances sent to
sites, and certain transporters of such substances. Id. § 9601(20)(A). CERCLA imposes
liability on four types of responsible parties: current owners or operators of a vessel or
facility; those who owned or operated a facility at the time hazardous waste was disposed
of or deposited; persons who arranged by contract to have hazardous substances
transported to, disposed of, stored, or treated at a facility owned or operated by someone
else; and transporters. Id. §9607(a)(l)-(4).
39 Id. § 9601(20)(A).
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that removes the lender from the so-called security-interest
exemption, or (2) foreclose and become the owner of a site (rather
than a security interest holder with mere "indicia of ownership").40
The scope of situations in which lenders are liable under CERCLA
41
has not always been clear, though amendments to the statute, passed
in 199642 and 2002,

have alleviated much uncertainty.

40 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CERCLA, BROWNFIELDS, AND LENDER LIABILITY,

(2007), availableat www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/lendersfactsheet.pdf.
41 Early cases disagreed on whether to distinguish a secured lender's exercise of
financial controls from participation in operational affairs. In 1990, UnitedStates v. Fleet
FactorsCorp. held that a secured lender could be liable as an operator "by participating in
the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor
actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable
.
Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557. The Fleet Factors approach was not
Fleet Factors
. .
universally adopted. In another 1990 case, In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., the Ninth Circuit
held that "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor
will fall outside the [security interest] exception [in section 101(A)(20)]." Hill v. E.
Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990). The EPA
responded to Fleet Factors by promulgating rules to negate the case, but the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals then ruled in Kelley v. EPA that the EPA lacked the authority under
CERCLA to make substantive rules limiting lenders' liability for costs of hazardous-waste
cleanups. See Kelley v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
42 The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607),
amended CERCLA to establish that "participation in management" does not include
activities like property inspection, giving financial advice, or requiring a debtor to respond
to contamination. A secured lender participates in management of a debtor for CERCLA
liability purposes, according to EPA guidelines, if it "exercises decision-making control
over a property's environmental compliance, or exercises control at a level similar to that
enjoyed by a manager of the facility or property." ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40.
With respect to foreclosure, the 1996 amendments state that foreclosing on a property
does not make a secured lender an "owner or operator" under CERCLA, provided that the
bank takes steps to sell the property "at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable
time, on commercially reasonable terms." Id. A secured creditor that has foreclosed may
maintain business activities and wind down operations on a site without becoming an
"owner or operator" under CERCLA, as long as the secured lender lists the property for
sale at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time. Id
43 In 2002, Congress passed the Brownfields Amendments, further clarifying the range
of situations in which secured creditors will be liable by creating new landowner liability
protection (for owners who purchase property after it has been contaminated by someone
else). Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
44 The way in which CERCLA implicates secured lenders creates some interesting
tensions. The issue is, on the one hand, respecting banks' positions as outside financers
who make investments and provide funds but are not responsible for debtors' actions,
while at the same time holding banks liable in situations in which they were in control of a
contaminating facility such that they are appropriate bearers of liability.
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If secured lenders were excluded categorically from CERCLA
liability, it could create moral hazard. Secured lenders and debtors
could deliberately effectuate conveyance of a first-priority interest in
the debtor's assets, knowing that the debtor may pollute for profit and
externalize cleanup costs to the government.4 5 Yet, if secured lenders
were categorically included in CERCLA's definition of owners and
operators, then lenders would have incentive to call defaults in
situations in which they might otherwise use their power to aid
debtors in avoiding or mitigating costs.
The relevance of CERCLA here is simply to show that the law
already acknowledges secured lenders' capacity for monitoring and
directing debtors' activities. It assigns liability for environmental
harm to secured parties in certain circumstances as a result.
While a secured party can have monitoring power and control over
a debtor in any secured transaction, secured parties commonly
establish these powers in transactions in which the parties use a
limited-liability special-purpose or project entity to protect a company
from risks associated with a given venture. In these very common
transactions, we can conceive of the secured lender as the party with
the most immediate financial stake in the debtor's activities.
The concept of limited liability is crucial to contemporary
commercial financing transactions. "Structured finance" refers to
transactions in which a company seeking to raise capital from lenders
transfers assets to a limited liability entity such as a corporation or an
LLC. The lenders then assess the credit of the entity apart from that
of its parent or owners. In transactions to fund projects, new
facilities, new developments, or the like, lenders fund the activity
undertaken by the special entity, taking a security interest in its assets
(and not necessarily in any assets of the parent). Of course a
transaction may create recourse to assets of a parent company, equity
holder or other party, but the model of lending against the value of
assets held by a limited liability entity with recourse only to such
assets is commonplace.
When a lender has a security interest in all assets of a limited
liability entity, it becomes an immediate bearer of financial risk. The

45 CERCLA provides that a federal government lien imposed by the statute "shall be
subject to the rights of any purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien
creditor whose interest is perfected under applicable State law before notice of the lien has
been filed." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(3).
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parent or owners have not expended their own funds to undertake the
project-the secured lender has. The secured lender should be first to
be repaid. Failure of a project that causes default on a loan directly
affects secured lenders; they cannot go after other parties or assets to
recoup their investment (in a limited-recourse transaction).
Securitization transactions rely on limited-liability special-purpose
entities to separate assets from liabilities with the goal of enhancing
credit. A company seeking to securitize rights to payment, for
example, sells these rights to a separate special-purpose entity. These
assets are thereby separated from any liabilities of the company as a
going concern. The separate special-purpose entity then issues debt
instruments secured by the rights to payment. The company can raise
more capital against the value of the assets in the hands of the limited
liability entity than it could if the assets were on its own books,
because the special-purpose entity has no liabilities to discount from
the assets' value.
The use of limited-liability special-purpose entities to isolate assets
is ubiquitous in commercial finance. For purposes of this discussion,
the relevance of limited liability structures in finance is that they
allow companies to shift the risk associated with any given venture to
the secured lenders. Risks are isolated to a project entity, and the
cash for that entity's activities comes from secured lenders. Owners
of the entity take any upside, such as profits in excess of the loan
obligations. Owners minimize exposure to losses by seeking lenders
to fund the project.
Lenders, of course, enjoy the upside of their expected return on
investment-repayment with interest-assuming there is not a
default. If a debtor does default, lenders can foreclose on assets.
Lenders also protect themselves against risk by creating diversified
portfolios of loans that they can sell to participating investors, either
with securitization transactions or through syndication.
Companies can transfer risks associated with any given project to
secured lenders, and secured lenders are not liable for effects of
applications of capital that they provide. If a project entity46 causes
environmental harm, its parent company or owners can be isolated

46 Project entities are limited liability entities formed for the sole purpose of developing,
owning and operating a particular project. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2005), available at http://www.bis

.org/publ/bcbsl 18.pdf.
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from liability; lenders funded the activities that resulted in harm, but
they are only liable in the limited situations involving hazardous
Because of this reality,
waste cleanup, as discussed above.
institutional lenders have taken it upon themselves to articulate
responsibility for avoiding environmental harm that could result from
projects they fund.
A long list of project financers has adopted the Equator
Principles-standards for secured lending that include a commitment
to fund only projects that meet certain environmental criteria.4 7 A
separate list of major institutional lenders has adopted the Carbon
Principles-commitments to undertake heightened due diligence
regarding environmental impact when financing fossil fuel generation
The Equator Principles apply in the context of
projects.48
transnational project finance.49 The Carbon Principles apply, so far,
only to North American power generation projects.
It is unknown, at the moment, what the effects of the Equator
Principles and the Carbon Principles will be. Though the Equator
Principles require subscribing banks to include in project loan
documentation covenants under which the borrower agrees to
maintain compliance with articulated environmental (and other)
standards, there is no obligation on the part of the lender to call an
event of default if such covenant were breached.I There are many
difficulties in enforcing nonfinancial defaults, like default in
compliance with an environmental standard that does not create
potential legal liability. With respect to the Carbon Principles, banks
may just be trying to minimize costs surrounding debtors' compliance
with anticipated regulation, or they may be attempting to influence

47 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES Ass'N, supra note 19.

Numerous major U.S. and foreign

lenders such as Bank of America, ABN AMRO, and Wells Fargo are Equator Principles
financial institutions.
48 See THE CARBON PRINCIPLES: FOSSIL FUEL GENERATION FINANCING ENHANCED
ENVIRONMENTAL DILIGENCE PROCESS, available at www.carbonprinciples.org (the
principles were developed by Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley with help from
leading power companies and environmental organizations); see, e.g., Bank of Am., supra
note 19.
49 See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N, supra note 19.
50 The subscribing banks "decided to focus on power generation in North America
because of attention to this market by legislators and other stakeholders," but may extend
the principles to other markets. CARBON PRINCIPLES Q & A, at Questions 11-12,
available at http://www.carbonprinciples.org/documents/Carbon%20Principles%20QA
.pdf.
st See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES Ass'N, supranote 19.
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the content of that regulation by proactively establishing the extent of
diligence they are willing to undertake.52
The relevance of the Equator and the Carbon Principles here is
simply to show that secured parties themselves recognize that in
transactional contexts in which the debtor is an entity formed to
isolate liability surrounding certain activities, secured parties can be
the primary parties taking financial risk and controlling for things like
environmental impact.
Again, the law here reflects the notion that effects of project
financing transactions are not relevant to commercial finance law
itself. Secured lenders are electing to acknowledge their relationship
to the environmental impact of debtors' activities with the Equator
and the Carbon Principles. Nothing in the law obligates or enforces
this acknowledgement.
The purpose here is not to argue for assignment of liability for
environmental harm to secured lenders. In this Part, the goal is
simply to understand the current relationship between lenders and
environmental costs.
The remainder of this Part shifts focus to challenge the notion that
commercial finance law should facilitate transactions without regard
for transactions' environmental effects. This is not the same as
challenging the extent to which secured lenders are isolated from
liability for environmental harm caused by debtors. The inquiry here
is not about whether to extend liability to secured lenders but whether
the private law rules that constitute commercial finance law could
themselves contemplate transactions' effects.
B. What Is a Debt Finance Law Issue, and What Is Not?
Lawmakers
environmental
task here is to
environmental

tend to conceive of environmental issues in terms of
regulation and not in terms of commercial law. The
explore and to challenge the logic of this separation of
concerns from commercial finance concerns.

52 A statement from subscribing banks entitled "Carbon Principles Q & A" reports: "We
believe it is important to provide a framework for clients and financers in this interim
period while legislation is being crafted and that the experience derived from the
Principles could also help inform the development of new and revised policy." CARBON
PRINCIPLES Q & A, supra note 50, at Question 8. The banks believe that fossil fuel
generation plants will be subject to more onerous legislation in the near future. Objectives
of the Carbon Principles may include limiting the extent of this reform by creating and
implementing standards in advance that are acceptable to the industry.
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This logic is steeped in the notion that commercial law is a tool that
It does not itself increase or
can be used for a range of ends.5
nor
does it affect whether the
of
transactions,
decrease the number
proceeds of any given transaction are applied to alleviate or to
aggravate environmental harm. In order to demonstrate, ultimately, a
relationship between contemporary financing practices in real estate
and a controversial outcome like suburban sprawl, it is necessary to
first ask foundational questions about the scope of commercial law
itself.
The commercial finance law primarily discussed here is UCC
Article 9, governing extensions of credit secured by personal
property. Many commercial finance transactions purport to effectuate
a sale, such as in the context of sale-leaseback transactions for the
financing of equipment. Securitization transactions involve two
steps: (1) a sale of assets to the special-purpose entity, and (2) a
simultaneous assignment by that entity of a security interest in the
assets to investors. Though these kinds of transactions are not simple
secured loans, they nonetheless implicate Article 9. In the context of
securitization, the special-purpose entity typically issues secured debt
instruments. 54 In the context of sale-leaseback transactions, the
buyer/lessor typically complies with the Article 9 requirements for
creation and perfection of a security interest. Depending on the
economic substance of a particular transaction, if the seller/lessee
were to become insolvent, a court could find the transaction to be a
secured loan governed by Article 9 (as opposed to a sale and lease).
Also, because UCC Article 9 concerns loans secured by personal
property (not realty), many do not realize its significance in the
context of real estate finance. Developers very frequently form
special-purpose or project entities to hold title to real estate. They
then raise capital to develop the real estate by assigning security
interests in the equity of the project entity-an assignment governed

53 See Hughes, supra note 20 (discussing the law-as-tool metaphor in terms of an
instrumentalist aesthetic in commercial law); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the
Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 973 (2005)

(discussing the metaphor of law as a tool, and aesthetic practices, in the context of
conflicts-of-law doctrine).
54 Also, depending on the level of recourse in the sales contract between the specialpurpose entity and the originator, that sales contract could in some cases be characterized
as a secured loan. See generally JAMES J. WHITE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: TEACHING
MATERIALS, 282-303 (3d ed. 2006).
55 See id at 46-67.
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by Article 9. This is true even though the entity is a shell that has no
assets or function other than holding title to land. Article 9 governs
the real estate mezzanine loans discussed in Part II.B.
1. How Can We Say that UCC Article 9 ItselfEscalates Commercial
Activity?
On the one hand, companies set out to undertake whatever projects
and activities further their goals. If secured debt financing were not
available to fund these undertakings, then, presumably, some other
type of financing or source of capital would be.
On the other hand, the fact that much commercial activity, as we
know it, could exist without Article 9 does not negate the facilitating
role that Article 9 currently plays for many commercial undertakings.
Article 9 provides a set of rules that make certain forms of secured
lending expeditious. To claim that it does not, then, escalate the
number (and therefore the effects) of the transactions it governs
would be to deny Article 9's own objectives and success.
UCC Article 9 decreases transaction costs by setting out uniform
rules for extensions of credit secured by personal property.
Decreasing transaction costs is not necessarily linked to increasing the
volume of commercial activity. Yet, at the same time, escalation of
certain types of commercial activity is widely associated with the
enactment of Article 9. Homer Kripke 5 6 asserts that "the legal
structure of secured credit developed to make possible mass
production and the distribution of goods."5 It would be inconsistent
to declare that secured transactions law makes mass production
possible, while at the same time deny that these rules escalate
commercial activity.
Commentators who doubt that secured transactions rules
themselves escalate commercial activity may disagree with Kripke.
But if one recognizes Article 9's facilitating effect on secured debt
financing, then it would be inconsistent to at the same time maintain
that this law does not, to some extent, escalate commercial activity.

56 Kripke was influential in the drafting of Article 9; he served as a member of the
Permanent Editorial Board for UCC Article 9. See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A
History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 359 (2001);
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321 (1962).
57 Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 931 n.14 (1985).
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2. Even if UCC Article 9 Does Escalate CertainForms of
CommercialActivity, Why Should Article 9 ContemplateEffects of the
TransactionsIt Governs?
Well, in a sense, it already does. Practitioners and commentators
tend to regard Article 9 as a set of technical rules to facilitate secured
lending without regard for effects of any given transaction, positive or
negative. But the UCC does contain numerous provisions aimed at
avoiding or producing certain effects in the contexts of particular
types of deals.
The Code was drafted with certain effects in mind,
such as decreases in transaction costs or increases in interstate
transactions (in response to uniformity).
The question, then, is whether there is some essential difference
between the kinds of effects the UCC contemplates and, for example,
environmental effects of the transactions it governs. One difference,
perhaps, is that the effects the UCC contemplates concern, primarily,
effectuating transactions themselves. The transactions' effects, we
might say, are another story. Aside from a generalized commitment
to the idea that growth is good, the effects the UCC deliberately
generates are primarily effects on commercial transactions, not effects
of commercial transactions.
But this distinction between effects on transactions and effects of
transactions is not necessarily a viable one. Reducing transaction
costs is not a neutral objective. Scholars and lawmakers have
vigorously debated whether UCC Article 9 should be reformed in
light of certain distributive consequences/effects of transactions
governed by its full-priority floating lien rules.59
Article 9 lowers costs of secured transactions by enabling lenders
to take a security interest in a wide range of assets with one
conveyance. This security interest is "full priority," meaning that the
secured lender can recover the full value of its interest if the debtor
defaults, before other creditors recover at all. If the security interest
covers after-acquired collateral (as Article 9 permits), this security
interest is a "floating lien," 6 0 meaning that the lender's lien attaches

58 See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
59 See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
60 "Floating lien" is a shorthand, not a statutory, term for a security interest that attaches
to after-acquired collateral and for which the Code dates priority for future advances by
the lender back to the date the lender first filed a UCC-1 financing statement or perfected
its interest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-204 to -205, -323 (2005).
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automatically to assets acquired after closing of the transaction.
Priority of the lender's interest in after-acquired collateral dates back
to the original filing the lender made in the UCC lien registry to give
notice of its interest '-in UCC terms, to perfect its interest to
establish priority.
Scholars have argued that the effects of transactions governed by
these rules are both unfair and inefficient because they disadvantage
Non-adjusting creditors are unsecured
non-adjusting creditors.
creditors that lack the opportunity to adjust their rate of return in
response to the risk presented by an Article 9 secured creditor.
Typical non-adjusting creditors include tort claimants, employees,
and retirees. In terms of efficiency, scholars have contended that
62
In
Article 9 artificially depresses the interest rates lenders charge.
terms of fairness, scholars have questioned whether Article 9 creditors
ought to recover the full value of their investments in advance of any
63
recovery by unsecured creditors.
Lawmakers have not revised Article 9 in response to these
arguments;64 the full priority structure prevails. What is interesting

61 Id

62 See Squire, supra note 29, at 844-67; cf Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried,
The Uneasy Casefor the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: FurtherThoughts and
a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1290 (1997) (discussing how costs of full

priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers and lenders); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1899 (1994)

(discussing the positions of non-adjusting creditors). But see Listokin, supra note 32
(examining the redistribution theory of secured credit with empirical assessment of the
prevalence of secured debt among "high-tort" firms); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case
for the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997) (arguing that

secured credit creates value for unsecured creditors).
63 See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 615-18 (1981);
LoPucki, supra note 12; Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The
Article 9 FullPriorityDebates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997).
64 Neither has the bankruptcy code, despite proposals made by Senator Richard J.

Durbin (D-Ill.) and Representative William D. Delahunt (D-Mass.) during the bankruptcy
reform process in 2002. See Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002). This bill would have enabled a bankruptcy
trustee to include assets assigned to a perfected secured creditor in the bankruptcy estate
under certain circumstances. It was presented as a way to protect workers and retirees
from corporate misconduct. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The
Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the
Durbin-DelahuntBill: What Were They Thinking?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1829 n.2

(2004). The Durbin-Delahunt bill was criticized by organizations such as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Bond Market
Association, and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, and the Options Clearing
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for purposes of this work is that opponents of these arguments about
Article 9 and non-adjusting creditors do not argue that the role of the
UCC is to reduce transaction costs without regard to its effects. The
idea that bad effects of transactions are grounds for reforming the
commercial law rules seems uncontroversial in the context of the
secured transactions literature on this issue. Opponents take issue
with the conclusion that secured transactions, per current Article 9
65
rules, are actually either inefficient or unfair. The debate is not, on
the one hand, arguments for reform in light of effects of secured
transactions and, on the other hand, arguments against reform on
ground that effects are not the province of the UCC. Rather, the
debate is between scholars who maintain that Article 9 rules enable
transactions that produce unfair and inefficient results and scholars
who assert that these transactions do not produce unfair or inefficient
results-or, at least, that the effects they do produce are extremely
valuable and would be jeopardized by reform. This recent debate
over effects of full-priority secured transactions highlights the
continuity of questions about the effects of rules on transactions and
the effects of transactions themselves. 66
One more point is in order here about the distinction between UCC
rules designed to produce effects on transactions-such as lowering
transaction costs-versus rules geared toward effects of
transactions-the real-world consequences of transactions. The UCC
does not simply lower transaction costs across the board without
regard for the effects of the transactions it is making less costly. The
UCC privileges some kinds of transactions over others because the
effects of some transactions are, apparently, more desirable than
others.

Corporation. Id. at 1831 (arguing that the Durbin-Delahunt bill was much more expansive
in its attempt to avoid the interests of secured creditors in bankruptcy than the bill's
sponsors had indicated). Its sponsors withdrew the bill in early September 2002. Id.
65See David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency ofSecuredLending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179,

2182 (1994) (arguing that ordinary price theory shows that secured lending is rational);
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2024-25 (1994)

(replying to fairness concerns by arguing that security interests are a form of property
interest, alienable despite effects on third parties); Schwarcz, supra note 62 (on the
efficiency of secured lending).
66 Part II will delve into more detail regarding the relationship between a particular type
of real estate development finance and the effects of the projects it funds.
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The Code expressly privileges, for example, financing secured by
rights to payment over contracts in which parties agree to prohibitions
on assignment. The result is reduced transaction costs for deals like
receivables securitization at the expense of fidelity to contractual
67
obligations to account debtors.
UCC section 9-408 provides that provisions in promissory notes,
health-care-insurance receivables, or general intangibles are
ineffective to the extent that they "would impair the creation,
attachment, or perfection of a security interest"6 8 in such assets or
provide that assignment of a security interest in these assets may give
rise to default or breach.69 Section 9-408 alters the effects of a
contractual anti-assignment provision.
Article 9 includes this
statutory overriding of anti-assignment clauses in order to encourage
70
certain modes of financing.
Under secured transactions law, this
kind of contract provision cannot prevent creation of a valid security
interest and is ineffective to create a contractual event of default or
breach. Because of section 9-408, companies can assign pools of
rights to payment to lenders or to special-purpose vehicles for
purposes of securitization without creating any worry for investors
over whether the underlying contracts require consent to such
assignment. Increasing access to capital by facilitating securitization
is an effect of section 9-408 that the Code finds more important than
71
the potential effects of this section on account debtors.

67 There is a twist to UCC section 9-408 in that later creditors can take effective security
interests, but cannot enforce their interests to the detriment of the other party to the
contract that prohibited assignment. U.C.C. § 9-408 (2005). If a debtor is party to an
agreement that restricts assignment, and the debtor assigns an interest in the agreement
anyway, the secured creditor cannot enforce its interests to the detriment of the other party
to the agreement. But the secured creditor will have a superior position at liquidation. It
can wait for disposition of assets if the debtor cannot pay and it will prevail.
68 Id. (a)(1).
69 Id. (a)(2).
70 See id. cmt. 2.

71Note that this feature of U.S. commercial law has been a subject of debate in rule-oflaw projects abroad. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, A View from the Field: Some
Observationson the Effect ofInternationalCommercialLaw Reform Efforts on the Rule of
Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 497 (1999). The laws of many foreign jurisdictions

do not permit assignment of receivables containing anti-assignment clauses. These
jurisdictions often require notice to the account debtor when the account is assigned.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Convention on
Assignment of Receivables overrides these local law provisions in nations that adopt it,
but this Convention has not received wide acceptance. See United Nations Convention on
the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, G.A. Res., 56/8 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th
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3. By What Logic Is EnvironmentalImpact a UCC Issue?
Environmental harm does not result from one cause or one actor.
UCC Article 9 does not "cause" environmental results any more than
failures of regulation, irresponsible corporate decisions, cultural lack
of commitment to conservation, or any other facet of the challenge
that environmental limitations present. The factors that contribute to
environmental harm are multiple. This reality does not justify
dismissing any one such factor from review.
Some have observed a failure of commercial finance law to
facilitate internalization or avoidance of environmental costs. UCC
Article 9 was substantially revised in the 1990s and reenacted by state
72
In the context of this debate, one member of
legislatures in 2001.
the Article 9 Task Force of the ABA Subcommittee on Agriculture
and Agri-Business Financing, Richard Barnes, cried out against the
use of floating liens and purchase money security interests (PMSIs) 73
in farm financing. In a 1993 article, he declared passionately, "The
farmer's own interests and those of his secured financers do not
permit the type of commitment needed to conserve soil and reduce
water pollution. Alternatives to the first-in-time priority system and
the purchase money device are necessary to achieve the national
commitment to protect soil and water." 74
The crux of Barnes's argument is that UCC Article 9 emphasizes
productivity over ecology in a way that influences how farmers
conduct their businesses and that limits the effectiveness of laws
meant to reduce pollution.75 Barnes calls for land stewardship in the
face of financing rules that enable agricultural practices that aggravate
nonpoint source water pollution and deterioration of land quality. But
his call has been, it seems, largely ignored. His article has received

Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 (Dec. 12, 2001); Nat'I Law Ctr.for Inter-Am. Free Trade,
United Nations Group Drafting Secured Transactions Guide, NOVEDADES, June 2006, at

1.
72 One topic of much debate during the revision discussions was how to treat
agricultural liens and security interests in farm assets. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 60910.
73 A PMSI arises when a secured party's extension of credit enables the debtor to
acquire new goods such as inventory or equipment. PMSIs have the benefit of special
priority rules that grant them priority in advance of prior, perfected secured creditors with
interests in after-acquired collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, -324 (2008).
74 Barnes, supra note 20, at 512 (arguing that the unitary security interest and PMSI
have aggravated environmental destruction of American farmland).
75 Id. at 511-12.
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few citations and the UCC drafting committee reports do not appear
to address environmental concerns in their discussions of the new
rules for agricultural finance.
This is not surprising, given major and obvious objections to this
thinking. UCC Article 9 is neutral in the sense that it does not
involve itself in the question of whether the secured transactions it
governs are, in any given instance, positive-value or negative-value
transactions. So, if we think critically about farmers and Article 9
finance, for example, Barnes argues that PMSIs encourage farmers to
seek credit beyond what their primary bank lenders will provide in
order to work the land beyond the point that the bank lenders think is
appropriate-a point past which, in most cases, the farming activity
76
Perhaps this is a reason to limit
will be environmentally harmful.
the extent to which, under UCC Article 9, production money or
purchase money lenders take priority over prior bank lenders in the
farm financing context.
But we can just as easily think of a scenario where a primary bank
lender is unwilling to extend additional credit to a farmer to produce a
crop because the farmer wants to use new environmentally friendly
techniques or machines, the results of which are less certain than
traditional, environmentally hazardous methods. In this scenario, the
availability of purchase money or production money credit for which
the creditor will have a priority position in advance of the primary
bank lender is a vehicle for sustainable practices. 7
In the abstract, the floating lien and PMSI structure can be used to
enter into transactions that harm the environment or, conversely,
transactions that improve the environment. Yet, the actual results of
farm practices in recent decades have been detrimental to vast
amounts of land and water. 8 Farmers could not have undertaken

76 See id.at 464-65, 473-96.

77 We could even craft enabling security-interest rules explicitly tailored for such types
of investment. Article 9 could include an "environmental practices money security
interest" that gives priority to investors extending credit to enable debtors to engage in
practices specifically geared toward environmental stewardship. See Hughes, supra note
28 (exploring the concept of an "environmental practices money security interest"
modeled on existing production money and PMSI rules).
78 Barnes, along with others, identifies nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution as a
serious environmental problem that has not responded adequately to top-down regulation
because of the dispersed nature of its sources. See Barnes, supra note 20, at 496-501; J.B.
Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q.
263 (2000) (discussing how legal measures fail to respond to agricultural runoff).
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these practices, it appears, without secured debt financing. So is this
a UCC Article 9 problem or not?
The Code drafters, originally and through subsequent revision
periods, have held that security interests in farm assets should be
treated like any other security interest. Farmers and farm lenders
should not operate under different financing rules despite the special
nature of farming, including its relationship to land.
Barnes's argument seems to be that UCC Article 9 is complicit in
environmental harm in that it induces behavior that aggravates
farming's negative impact on the environment. Barnes is not alone in
making this kind of charge against commercial finance rules. J.
William Futrell writes about "law's prejudice against sustainability"
and finds that this prejudice continues into the area of finance law.
Benjamin J. Richardson makes similar arguments about finance law
in Canada.so He states, for example, that although Canada has greatly
improved its environmental laws since the 1970s, a "lack of
interaction between environmental and financial policy" creates for
environmental law a great handicap.81 "Because financial markets
shape decisions concerning future development and thus resulting
environmental pressures, the reform of investment, banking, and other
financial services to promote more environmentally sensitive
financing should be a government priority."82
These perspectives on commercial finance law build upon
arguments that present environmental harm as a form of market
failure. 8 3 We can understand Barnes to be making a context-specific
version of an established argument that we recognize from the
environmental movement more generally.
This argument contends that environmental harm is a market
failure in that market transactions do not reflect costs of this harm.

79 J. William Futrell, The Transition to SustainableDevelopment Law, 21 PACE ENVTL.

L. REV. 179, 188 (2003).
80 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for
CanadianEnvironmentalLaw, 49 MCGILL L.J. 145 (2004).
81 Id. at 147.
82 Id
83 For example, Nicholas Stem's influential report on climate change states: "Climate
change presents a unique challenge for economists: it is the greatest and widest-ranging
market failure ever seen." NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i, available at http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern review-report.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011).

390

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 359

of
Negative environmental consequences are externalities
transactions-costs that are transferred to the public, not priced into
transactions themselves. Because the law permits market actors to
externalize environmental costs of their transactions, these costs are a
form of market failure. The idea here is that a functioning market
would discipline market actors to account for environmental harm and
price transactions accordingly.
In the context of secured transactions, we could say that because
debtors and secured lenders can enter into transactions that are
profitable for them but have environmental consequences that are
costly for the public, they are complicit in this market failure. Barnes
finds the full-priority floating lien and PMSI to be collateral security
devices that encourage just the sort of transactional activity that
emphasizes short-term financial gains for private parties at the
expense of harm to farmland.84 So, we could say that threats to the
environment are a UCC problem in the sense that the rules enacted in
the UCC enable transactions that externalize environmental costs. 85
This inquiry leads to another consideration. If environmental harm
can be a UCC problem, then what about other types of costs the UCC
rules could address? It is true that environmental challenges are
unique and collective; but, at the same time, commercial actors are
also in a position to alter other kinds of effects of commercial activity.
Thinking specifically about controversy surrounding suburban
sprawl, there seems to be a direct connection between developers'
incentives, the inability of land-use policies to control sprawl, and
When specific
contemporary real estate finance practices.
commercial law rules yield effects that are controversial in particular
circumstances, we should revisit these rules and consider the
circumstances. The fact that commercial law rules may also produce
other controversial effects does not justify an abandonment of
commercial finance law to the current constellation of effects that it
contemplates.

See Barnes, supra note 20, at 491.
Part II.C explores this logic in more detail by considering it in the context of a
specific type of transaction that permits transfer of risk and externalization of costs related
to controversial environmental results.
84
85
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II
CONTEXTUALIZED DISCUSSION: FINANCE AND SUBURBIA

Currently, the task of making value judgments about different
approaches to growth is largely relegated to local governments and
communities. This project suggests that the work of determining
which approaches to growth are desirable could be taken up at the
state level.
A. Sprawl
It is virtually impossible to speak categorically about a
phenomenon as diverse and widespread as suburbanization.8 The
Not all suburban
word "sprawl" has a negative connotation.
developments contribute to sprawl, and the concept of sprawl is
contested. Though many lament its negative environmental impact,
its causes, its benefits, and its drawbacks-attributes ftmdamental to
88
its very definition-are subjects of debate.
Below are two working definitions that attempt to capture the
concept of sprawl. Edwin S. Mills states, "Sprawl means excessive
Excessive means more than can be utility
suburbanization.
enhancing. Of course, how much suburbanization is utility enhancing
depends on context.... Suburbanization has been both inevitable and
This
mostly utility enhancing, but it can also be excessive."8
can
be
that
excess
it
implies
and
excess,
to
definition relates sprawl
determined by a context-specific utility calculus (that would
undoubtedly be highly complex). 90

86 "Suburban studies" has produced numerous important texts, including ROBERT
FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS (1987); HAYDEN, supra note 2; KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); NATURE
IN FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL (Elizabeth A. Johnson & Michael W. Klemens
eds., 2005); ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: SUBURBAN SPRAWL
AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001).
87 See, e.g., Stop Sprawl: Reports and Factsheets, SIERRA CLUB, www.sierraclub.org
/sprawl/reports.
88 See, e.g., BRUEGMANN, supra note 2; Edwin S. Mills, Sprawl and Jurisdictional
Fragmentation, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS: 2006, at 231
(Gary Burtless & Janet Rothenberg Pack eds., 2006); Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on
Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874
(2000); Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L. REV. 447
(2003).
89 Mills, supranote 88.
90 Id.
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Taking a different kind of approach, Timothy J. Dowling defines
sprawl as "low-density, land-consuming, automobile-dependent,
haphazard, non-contiguous (or 'leapfrog') development on the fringe
of settled areas . . . that intrudes into rural or other undeveloped

areas." 9 ' This kind of description is more detached from the concept
of utility. In theory, a development could fit Dowling's definition but
still provide benefits that outweigh its associated costs. Dowling
implies both that sprawl is problematic, regardless of the utility of any
given development, and that sprawl creates costs to the environment
92
or to communities that cannot be captured in a utility calculus.
Court decisions on land use regulation have recognized concerns
that sprawl implicates. In rejecting a Fifth Amendment takings claim
against certain zoning ordinances, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that it is clearly legitimate for local governments to discourage "the
premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban
uses." 93 Yet, despite the validity of zoning that could effectuate wellplanned growth, sprawl continues.94 In fact, legal scholars have
observed that most suburban zoning codes tend to promote, rather
than discourage, sprawl. 9 5
The Supreme Court has certainly never ordered local governments
to protect open space; it has merely affirmed governments' capacity
to make rules to achieve this end if they so desire. Nonetheless, the
Court identified in Agins v. City of Tiburon one of the issues at the
core of the challenges that sprawling growth presents: premature and

91 Dowling, supra note 88. Dowling draws on a report by a local government
association that defines sprawl as "low density, discontinuous, automobile-dependent, new
development on the fringe of settled areas." NAT'L Ass'N OF LOCAL GOV'T ENVTL.
PROF'LS, PROFILES OF BuSINESs LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWTH: NEW PARTNERSHIPS
DEMONSTRATE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REDUCING SPRAWL 8 (1999).
92 Dowling, supranote 88, at 887.
93Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), overruled by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that whether a statute substantially
advances a legitimate state interest is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings
for which just compensation is required). The Court's 2005 decision altering the nature of
takings analyses does not detract from the relevance, for this work, of the statement in
Agins excerpted above.
94 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem ofInstitutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999); Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its
Enemies: Why the Enemies are Losing, 34 CONN. L. REV. 539 (2002).
95 See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000); Gerald
E. Frug, Against Centralization,48 BUFF. L. REV. 31 (2000).
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unnecessary conversion of open-space land.9 6
The pace of
development and the possibilities for premature or unnecessary
building are related to commercial finance practices like securitization
and mezzanine lending.
Many commentators associate sprawl with both environmental and
social problems. For example, some scholars focus on sprawl's
Others focus on
negative impact on public or civic life.
environmental problems associated with sprawl, such as increased
carbon footprints of both houses themselves and the people living in
them who need to drive more to reach services and jobs. Another
environmental problem associated with sprawl is the consumption of
natural resources that provide essential ecological services. 9 8
Numerous scholars have studied the failure of zoning to contain
They
growth patterns that are environmentally controversial.9 9
identify a range of causes for this, including consumer preferences,too
municipal finance issues, and developers' use of SLAPP suits.10 1 J.B.
Ruhl and James Salzman write, "Every morning in cities across the

96 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
97 See, e.g., DUANY ET AL., supra note 7 (discussing how a physical environment
defined by sprawling development encourages a lack of community and communal space,
and withdrawal from public life).
98 See NATURE IN FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL, supra note 86 (discussing
sprawl's negative impact in terms of biodiversity, pollution, and overexploitation of
resources); Elizabeth Farnsworth, Scientific Solutionsfor Sprawl, 88 ECOLOGY 531 (2007)
(reviewing NATURE INFRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL, supra note 86, and stating
the need to bring scientific knowledge about sprawl's impact on the environment to local
planning discussions on development). For a description of ecosystem services, see
NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997); see also sources cited supra note 14.
99 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 94.
100 See ELIZABETH KOPITS ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RFF DP 09-15, LOT
SIZE, ZONING, AND HOUSEHOLD PREFERENCES: IMPEDIMENTS TO SMART GROWTH?
(2009), availableat http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-15.pdf.
101 "SLAPP" refers to "strategic lawsuits against public participation"-actions brought
by developers against opponents of their projects in order to silence criticism. These suits
may claim, for example, that parties who oppose developers' requests are interfering with
a developer's business advantage or are conspiring with government actors to deprive
developers of property rights without due process of law. These suits succeed when
defendants are intimidated or unable to fight to establish their rights to speak out against
projects they oppose. Litigants who do actively defend SLAPP suits have had success
establishing a first amendment right to petition public officials. See, e.g., Westfield
Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Massachusetts has enacted a
statute to protect against SLAPP suits. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2010). See
generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
941-43 (4th ed. 2006).
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nation, grumbling commuters inch along, locked in traffic gridlock,
yet no local or regional planning agency can solve its causesuburban sprawl."' 1 Ruhl and Salzman contend that sprawl is an
example of a "massive problem"-a problem so big and unwieldy
that it "has defied all variety of policy prescriptions."1 03 Ruhl and
Salzman's project concerns strategies for government agencies to
"whittle away" at massive problems. 10 4 They observe that, in the
case of sprawl, the mechanisms of the problem contain "components
operating at different spatial and temporal scales, with causal
feedback loops across and between scales. It is unlikely that any
single level of government is better positioned than any other to
address that kind of problem."10 5 Scholars like Ruhl and Salzman are
seeking to develop new and better methods for regulators to control
sprawl.
Debate continues over the advantages and disadvantages of
sprawling development and "smart growth" and over which groups or
governing bodies should make policy decisions about growth
While this debate unfolds, the inquiry in this Article
patterns. 1
concerns whether and how developers and financers drive land-use
outcomes ex ante by the sheer force of economic interests that can
arise from current financing practices. The discussion here considers
whether developers do, or should, have sufficient "skin in the game"
with respect to projects to develop open space.
B. Securitizationand StructuredFinance in Real Estate Development
Mezzanine loans are a common form of real estate development
finance.1o7 They enable real estate developers os to issue high-

102 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems

in the Administrative State: A Guidefor Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010).
103 Id. at 64.
104 Id. at 65.
105 Id. at 65-66.
106 See BRUEGMANN, supra note 2; Marcilynn A. Burke, The Emperor's New Clothes:
Exposing the Failuresof Regulating Land Use Through the Ballot Box, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1453, 1476-86 (2009) (discussing the recent trend toward regulating land use with
ballot initiatives and arguing that ballot box zoning results in deliberative failure and land
use planning failure); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative
InstitutionalAnalysis Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 509, 519 (2000) (analyzing the
issue of 'deciding who decides' in the context of policy questions surrounding sprawl).
107 For a general discussion of mezzanine lending, see Joseph Philip Forte, Mezzanine

Finance: A Legal Background, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE
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priority debt to fund the development of housing. Developers may
also use another transactional structure, such as a preferred equity
investment or a junior mortgage. A large, publicly traded developer
may undertake projects on its own. For reasons discussed below,
mezzanine lending and preferred equity investments have become far
more common than junior mortgages.
Developers typically acquire realty with a mortgage loan; the
mortgagee has a first-priority lien on the land and will lend only up to
some percentage of its appraised value. Once a development
company has acquired real estate, it then seeks capital to undertake
construction on the land.
The company may fund the development with contributions from
the individuals or entities that are participating in the projecttypically, members in an LLC that constitutes the development
company for a given project. But in many instances these participants
do not raise funds beyond what is necessary to form the LLC and
acquire (again, usually with a mortgage loan) the undeveloped land.
So in order to fund construction, they may assign a security interest in
their equity in the project entity to obtain a loan from an outside
financer-frequently, a mezzanine lender.1 10 By doing this, they

LAWYERS 437 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials Ser. No. SJ090, 2004); Steven G.
Horowitz & Lise Morrow, Mezzanine Financing, in REAL ESTATE FINANCING
DOCUMENTATION: STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING TIMES 541 (ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials Ser. No. SJ005, 2004).
108 The term "developer" can mean equity participants in a real estate development
project or it can mean the person or entity that contracts with builders, lawyers, and others
to undertake the project. Here, "developers" refers to the persons who identify and
undertake real estate development projects in pursuit of the profits derived from sale or
lease of the improved property.
109 See generally Andrew R. Berman, "Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage"--The
Use (and Misuse oJf Mezzanine Loans and PreferredEquity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 76 (2005) (discussing the effects of securitization on real estate financing
practices). The purpose here is to examine the relationship between one very common
form of secured transaction and the environmental consequences of the activities it funds.
We could make similar inquiries of other transactional structures as well. For other
variations of transactions for real estate development, see John C. Murray, Clogging
Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279 (1998).
110 Mezzanine loan deals typically involve an inter-creditor agreement between the
mortgage lender and the mezzanine lender under which the mortgage lender agrees, among
other things, to permit the mezzanine lender to cure any defaults on the mortgage loan.
For a discussion of these inter-creditor agreements, see Ellen M. Goodwin, Mezzanine
Finance: Senior Lender Form ofIntercreditorAgreement, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
FINANCE 2002: WHAT BORROWERS AND LENDERS NEED TO KNOW Now 997 (PLI Real
Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. N-478, 2002).
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transfer much of the risk to outside investors if the project fails, while
still retaining the right to profit if it succeeds.
Scholars report that participant equity is typically five to ten
percent, with the combination of mortgage and mezzanine lending
providing approximately ninety percent of a typical real estate
development project's capital structure cost."' In theory, a developer
could raise funds with a mezzanine loan and not necessarily leverage
a project to ninety percent of its capital costs. But in practice,
mezzanine loans are used to generate high degrees of leverage; they
are priced and structured to fill the gap between what mortgage
lenders will fund and the project's capital requirements.112
Mezzanine loans are governed by UCC Article 9, and the collateral
assigned to the lender is typically one hundred percent of the
membership interests in an LLC that owns land for development. The
mezzanine borrower (the obligor on the loan) is an LLC. This LLC
has a wholly owned subsidiary-another LLC-that owns the
underlying realty. The borrower assigns a security interest to the
mezzanine lender in the membership interests of the subsidiary LLC
that holds the land.1 13 The real estate developers themselves-the
participants in the project-are the members-the equity holders-of
the mezzanine borrower.

l See Murray,supra note 109, at 302.
112See Berman, supra note 109; Murray, supra note 109.
113While in everyday speech we may use "debtor" interchangeably with "borrower,"
under Article 9 a debtor is a party that assigns a security interest in property, regardless of
whether the debtor is also an obligor (a party obligated to repay the loan). See U.C.C. § 9102(a)(28), (59) (2005) (defining "debtor" and "obligor," respectively).
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One key feature of these transactions is an inter-creditor agreement
between the mezzanine lender and the senior mortgage lender. This
agreement establishes several rights of the mezzanine lender that
make the transaction attractive.' 1 Though these rights can vary from

114 See Goodwin, supra note 110.
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deal to deal, they often include the right to receive any notices of
default on the senior mortgage, along with rights to cure any defaults
and the right to receive the proceeds of any sales of new homes in the
development in advance of participants in the project, such as the
senior mortgage lender or owner. Senior mortgage lenders agree to
these provisions because the mezzanine lender provides capital for
improvement of the property that increases its value, which increases
the value of the mortgage lender's collateral and thereby improves the
mortgage lender's position.
The mezzanine lender is willing to do this because it typically
charges a higher interest rate and has rights to foreclose on its
collateral to become the owner of the entity that holds title to the land
This, in combination with
and that is obligated on the mortgage.'
its rights under the inter-creditor agreement and its right to proceeds
of sales, makes mezzanine lending attractive.
From the developers' perspective, these deals are attractive because
they provide capital beyond what a mortgage lender will provide for
improvement of land. By creating an LLC that holds title to the land,
the developer creates a new class of collateral that can be assigned to
raise capital with debt. The value of the LLC membership interests is
not necessarily limited to the value of the realty itself in its
unimproved state. Rather, the value of this entity includes its
potential-its development permits and other rights, its investment in
architectural planning, and its contract rights. Mezzanine lending is a
way for developers to capture and leverage all of the value of a
project that exists in addition to the appraised value of the
unimproved real estate.
A mezzanine loan is typically nonrecourse, meaning that the lender
has recourse only to its collateral-membership interests in an LLCand not to other assets of the debtor or assets of the debtor's owners.
(The debtor is typically a special-purpose company that has no assets
other than the membership interests in the project company.)
However, mezzanine lenders often include some carve-outs to the

115 This is not to say that mezzanine lenders have an easy time recovering the value of
their claims in the event of default The structure of mezzanine lending-especially the
inter-creditor agreement-is designed to facilitate avoidance of default or bankruptcy, not
to position the mezzanine lender for recovery of valuable assets upon default. See
Berman, supra note 21 (discussing the challenges that mezzanine lenders face when they
attempt to recover value from their debtors through foreclosure, given that their collateral
is the equity of an entity rather than the underlying realty).
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nonrecourse provisions, namely for negligence or other misbehavior
on the part of the project's owners. These carve-outs prevent
developers from transferring risk created by their own bad actions.
If the new homes are never completed, do not sell, or do not sell at
a profit, then the project company, and the equity interests of its
owner, are valued accordingly. The members lose what they put in to
acquire the interests: a relatively small amount if the project company
acquired land with a mortgage loan and undertook construction with
proceeds of mezzanine financing. If the project is completed and the
homes sell at projected prices, the members of its owner get the
difference between the mortgage and mezzanine loan amounts (with
interest) and the total proceeds of home sales.
There are, of course, many different types of developers and
development ventures, some of which are more vulnerable to the
failure of any given project than others. A small developer may use
mezzanine lending to undertake a project but nevertheless be very
vulnerable to reputational risk or personal financial risk, even though
initial outlays of capital are relatively small. The type of risk shifting
that this work contemplates is in contexts where a development
company with a portfolio of projects minimizes its exposure to risk in
a way that facilitates undertaking a high volume of development:
For purposes of UCC Article 9, LLC membership interests are, in
Membership interests can be
most cases, general intangibles.
investment property in cases where the members so designate in their
117
In some cases, mezzanine lenders require
operating agreement.
that the equity of the LLC in which they take an interest be designated
as securities in accordance with UCC Article 8 (governing investment
property). The lenders then perfect their interests by taking control of
the interests. 18 They may also file a UCC-1 financing statement to
give additional notice of their interests.
From an Article 9 perspective, the rules for creation, attachment,
and perfection of the security interest in mezzanine financing are
straightforward. For one thing, these transactions involve only one

116 This is a catch-all category of personal property that does not fit any of the other
collateral definitions. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
117 See id. § 8-103(c).
118Membership interests in LLCs that are investment property may be certificated or
uncertificated securities. Id.
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Mezzanine lenders will
type of personal property collateral.
undertake a title review and other diligence as if they were making
mortgage loans because the equity interests that are their collateral are
in project entities that exist only to hold title to (and limit liability
surrounding) real estate. 12
Because the collateral is LLC
membership interests and not realty, the lender need only follow the
Article 9 rules for creation and perfection of its interest. Namely, the
parties meet the criteria in UCC section 9-203 for creation and
attachment of a valid security interest,121 and the lender perfects its
interest by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the jurisdiction in
which the debtor is locatedl22 or, in cases in which the LLC members
opt into UCC Article 8, by establishing control of the collateral.123
In the early years of mezzanine financing, mezzanine lenders might
have been individuals or other real estate development companies that
wanted to participate in a project, but did not want, for whatever
reason, to have an equity position.124 This approach to mezzanine
finance, however, has been dwarfed since the 1990s by institutional
lenders creating mezzanine loan portfolios that they themselves sell or
assign to raise capital. Many real estate development companies are
not required to report the capital structures of their projects.
Numerous sources refer to a surge in popularity of mezzanine finance
since the 1990s and to the fact that developers often use this type of

119 Cf Berman, supra note 21, at 1030 (describing mezzanine lending as complex in the
sense that these loans can raise complex questions, and that issues surrounding lenders'
options for realizing value out of mezzanine loan collateral in foreclosure can be
complex).
120 In factBerman has argued that mezzanine loans (and preferred equity financing for
real estate development) should be treated as mortgage substitutes. See Berman, supra
note 109.
121 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (specifying that to create a valid interest, the creditor must give
value, the debtor must have rights in the collateral, and the parties must enter into an
agreement-which may be evidenced in a range of ways-under which the debtor assigns
a security interest).
122 See id. §§ 9-310(a), -301, -307.
123 Id. §§ 8-106, 9-313, 9-314. The method of establishing control of membership
interests that are investment property varies depending on whether the interests are
certificated or uncertificated. See id. § 8-106.
124 Note that the position of a mezzanine lender is very similar to an equity position
because the borrower has no other creditors and the collateral is one hundred percent of
equity interests in a special-purpose company. See Georgette Chapman Poindexter,
Dequity: The Blurring of Debt and Equity in Securitized Real Estate Financing, 2
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 233, 240 (2005).
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loan.125 A Moody's Investors Service report states that in 2006,
issuances of mezzanine debt in CDOs were valued at "approximately
$3.22 billion." 2 6 While this number does not indicate what portion
of developments was funded with mezzanine lending, it does give a
sense of the size of the securitized mezzanine loan market in 2006.
The rise of mezzanine finance has been a function of the rise of
securitization itself. The relationship between mezzanine lending and
First, mezzanine lenders often
securitization has two facets.
securitize mezzanine loans themselves, raising money through capital
markets to fund mezzanine loans. Second, securitization facilities for
mortgage loans frequently prohibit mortgage debtors from incurring
other significant debt. The structure of mezzanine lending enables
new debt that does not run afoul of this prohibition. Scholars, such as
Georgette Chapman Phillips, have observed, "The mezzanine lending
market grew in the United States in response to the limitation on debt
financing in many securitized transactions."1 2 7
When a developer raises funds with a mezzanine loan, it in effect
shifts risk of a project's failure to the mezzanine lender. The
mezzanine lender is often a large institutional financer that in turn
shifts the risk associated with the projects it funds to investors
Because the structure of securitized
through securitization.
mezzanine finance enables shifting of risk from the developer to the
lender and from the lender to capital markets, mezzanine finance can
create incentives to develop more land in a more speculative manner
than the developer otherwise could or would.128 Again, there is

125 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 21, at 996; Paul Rubin, Strategic Thinking for the

Mezzanine Lender, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 42 (referring to the "popular use"
of these loans since the 1990s).
126 DANIEL B. RUBOCK, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., US CMBS AND CRE CDO:
MOODY'S APPROACH TO RATING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE MEZZANINE LOANS 2
(2007), available at http://dirt.umkc.edulattachments/MDYMezz%20Loans.pdf
127 Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Paradox of Commercial Real Estate Debt, 42

CORNELL INT'L L.J. 335, 358 (2009).
128 Andrew Berman, in the course of arguing that mezzanine loans should be treated by
courts as mortgage substitutes, notes that these loans can induce unnecessary risks as
lenders miscalculate courts' willingness to treat them as loans secured by equity, and not
as subordinated debt secured by real estate. "By failing to take into account certain
inherent risks associated with secured subordinated financing, mezzanine lenders and
preferred equity investors invariably engage in riskier lending practices either by overextending credit or under-pricing loans. These practices all lead to unnecessary risk taking
by all of the market participants." Berman, supra note 109, at 122 (discussing the risk
associated with characterization of mezzanine loans after default). Note that other scholars
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nothing inherently wrong with risk transfer; risk transfer is at the
heart of many common financial transactions. It enables borrowers to
undertake projects that would not otherwise have funding, yielding
important new development and growth.
In certain contexts,
however, risk transfer creates moral hazard and aggravates
externalities surrounding commercial transactions.129 The project,
here, is to consider the extent to which development of open-space
land is a context in which risk transfer by real estate financers can
aggravate controversial environmental results.
Given the environmental impacts associated with certain modes of
real estate development, perhaps we ought to consider the possibility
of instituting special rules pertaining to these transactions in some
contexts. If we link a given secured transaction to the environmental
consequences of the activities it funds, we may, for example, consider
possibilities for a regulatory subject-a "mezzanine finance limited
liability company"-that commercial law rules could define in order
to reshape the capacities of certain types of private actors. 1o

do not agree with the notion that mezzanine loans should be treated like subordinated debt
secured by realty. See Phillips,supra note 127.
129 See supra note 9.

130 It is beyond the scope of this Article to make a policy proposal. Conceptually,
though, one idea to explore might be an "Open Space Development LLC Act." State
legislatures could enact new statutory rules either within or apart from UCC Article 9 that
govern assignment of interests in LLCs that hold open space for development.
Environmentalists have made arguments, in the real property context, about areas of land
being differently situated such that not all land should be alienable in the same way. See
ERIC FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE (2003). These arguments could inform a
rethinking of the various classes of personal property and the commercial law rules that
govern their assignment as security. We could imagine, for example, an equity carve-out
to assignments of interests in "mezzanine finance LLCs" holding the equity of an entity
that holds undeveloped land that is zoned for residential housing on lots of a certain size.
This type of act would need to define "mezzanine finance LLC" and then determine some
percentage beyond which interests in this type of LLC may not be assigned to secure a
loan.
This type of equity carve-out would not stop any particular kind of development. It
would merely make a certain source of capital unavailable beyond a defined threshold in
certain contexts. Any development could proceed, but in contexts involving a "mezzanine
finance LLC," only a certain percentage of the membership interests of the project entity
holding land would be assignable as security. The idea would be to ensure that developers
have "skin in the game" when they undertake certain kinds of projects by prohibiting
assignment of one hundred percent of the membership interests in LLCs in certain
contexts. This could minimize developers' capacity to transfer market risk and externalize
environmental risk in situations in which developers may be building at an accelerated
pace to meet demands that are not sustainable, either environmentally or in terms of
continuing housing market expansion.
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We are all aware of the 2007 crash of the real estate market, the
collapse in value of many mortgage-backed securities, and the
resulting effects on financial institutions. This crisis-and the public
response to it-has not prompted fundamental refiguring of the
practices of securitization or mezzanine lending. Public discourse has
focused overwhelmingly on ensuring that these types of transactions
The
are well executed and involve sufficient due diligence. 3t
discussion seems to focus primarily on recovery of the market.
A recovered or healthy market will undoubtedly involve
securitized mezzanine lending. These transactions will continueonly the pace may be different, but even this remains to be seen. In
fact, ABA-CLE advertises materials (first available in May 2010)

If a developer could not raise funds to build on open space by assigning all of the equity
of the project LLC to an institutional mezzanine lender, then the developer would have to
more carefully assess the project to ensure that it would be value-adding, at least from the
perspectives of the builder and the potential buyers.
Financers could innovate, of course, to generate a new form of transaction that replaces
mezzanine finance. If they do, then lawmakers could examine whether new financing
practices affect land use results in a way that warrants review.
Of course, statutory limits on certain types of security interests are just one possible idea
to consider. A different approach might look to commercial actors themselves, rather than
legislation. Institutional lenders could include provisions in mezzanine financing contracts
that create threatening levels of recourse if developers disregard environmental objectives.
For example, lenders could require an environmental impact assessment of a
prospective development that includes a report on the development's projected carbon
footprint. The lender could then include, in its financing documents, covenants that
require the developers to build in a way that meets certain objectives to reduce the
development's carbon footprint. These requirements could be as stringent as requiring the
use of certain materials and energy sources, or as minimal as requiring that the
development contain foot and bicycle paths that provide access to a bus stop. Costs of
enforcing these covenants, and any damages for breach, could be sought from the
members of the mezzanine borrower-the developers themselves-and not just from the
proceeds or value derived from the equity of the development LLC.
The lender could require the developer to draft underlying homeowner association
covenants to include things like fees that support energy-efficient transportation from the
neighborhood to shopping or other common destinations. Once the homes were sold, of
course, maintenance of this obligation would no longer be within the lender's or
developer's control. It would be up to the new association to continue these activities.
These contract-based approaches would suffer the same limitations as the Equator
Principles and Carbon Principles discussed above. Nothing obligates a lender to call an
event of default or to seek remedies in response to any given contractual default.
131 For example, there has been much outcry about mortgage loans made to borrowers
in contexts in which the originators did nothing to verify borrowers' ability to pay, selling
the loans into securitization facilities such that risk of borrower nonpayment was not their
concern. At the same time, banks invested in mortgage-backed securities without
demanding substantiation of the quality of the underlying loans.
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covering the issue that "[p]ermanent lenders are financing now at
lower loan to value ratios than previously and mezzanine financing is
a key tool to bridging the equity gap."' 3 2 In other words, as mortgage
lenders return to requiring that borrowers have some equity in
property, mezzanine lending becomes an important way to continue
development practices that depend on higher degrees of leverage.
C. Is Sprawl a Function of CommercialFinanceLaw, or Is It Not?
Many scholars
Suburban sprawl is intensely controversial.
associate it with grave environmental challenges, as well as with
social and cultural challenges. New residential subdivisions get built
with the proceeds of certain, identifiable forms of debt finance
transaction. This Section seeks to define the relationship between
these two realities.
1. How Can We Say that Mezzanine FinanceItselfEscalates Certain
Types ofDevelopment? And Why Focus on Securitized Mezzanine
Finance as Opposed to Monetary Policy or FactorsAltogether Apart
from Finance?
No single form of transaction determines what developers will
build. Monetary policy, some might say, is the driving factor in
housing development and markets: when interest rates are low and
buyer demand is high, there will be new housing developments. But
at the same time, the pace of development bears at least some
relationship to the degree of leverage and risk transfer that structured
finance enables.
The inquiries at issue here might be relevant to other transaction
structures that facilitate transfer of risk and leverage, such as
This discussion targets securitized
securitization generally.
mezzanine lending in particular because it is a commercial finance
practice in which the parties are sufficiently proximate to the
underlying development to control and anticipate its environmental
effects, and yet at the same time, the parties are raising funds through
capital markets.

132See ABA Web Store, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/index

.cfm?section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=5430528CD

(last visited Nov. 18,

2011) (advertising ABA-CLE, Mezzanine Financing: Bridging the Gap in Loan
Refinancings CD-ROM, May 2010).
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The mezzanine loan is a commonly used form of financial
transaction that permits developers to leverage projects beyond what
other financing structures allow. 3 3 . While securitization expands
access to capital for financing development, mezzanine lending
provides the structure for the degree of leverage that certain modes of
' 34
development require.
The use of the LLC to hold title to realty and act as mezzanine
borrower creates a class of collateral that was not otherwise available
for assignment. We could discuss securitization, or "cheap money"
generally, but if the purpose of this inquiry is to consider the
connection between secured transactions and environmental
consequences, then the mezzanine loan is particularly relevant. The
point here is not to say that certain developments happen "because of'
mezzanine loans rather than, say, consumer preferences or cheap
gasoline, among other things. To say that mezzanine finance
facilitates certain modes of development is not to isolate it as the only
factor doing this.
For purposes of thinking through the relationship between
commercial finance rules and environmental results, the securitized
mezzanine loan stands out as a transaction operating at the core of a
controversial environmental phenomenon: suburban sprawl. While
other transactional forms for leveraging real estate development
projects certainly exist, commercial transactions tend toward path
Once highly evolved form documentation for a
dependency.
particular structure exists, parties tend to repeat the structure. This
repetition and standardization of transaction forms is part of what
facilitates the large-scale packaging and sale of the transactions for
securitization.13 5
We might say that mezzanine financing itself escalates certain
types of development because it expands access to capital for
developers using standardized transactional forms in which finaicers

133 See supra Part II.B.

134 Again, it is a widespread, established form of finance for leveraging real estate
development projects beyond what is possible with mortgage lenders. See supra Part II.B.
135 Numerous scholars have discussed path dependency and form documentation in
commercial transactions. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in CorporateContracting (or "the Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L.

REV. 713, 718 (1997); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998); David V. Snyder, Private
Lawmaking, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
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take a security interest in standardized types of collateral. An
institutional lender will have form documentation for making loans to
developers building certain types of new residential subdivisions. If
the mezzanine lender funds these loans with proceeds of
securitization transactions, it may have standing securitization
facilities into which new loans to developers are directed. What this
implies for land-use results on the ground is that investors may have
already reviewed and approved of form documentation for loans to
developers secured by certain types of housing development. When
market conditions support new home building and buying, there can
be a kind of queue of funding for projects fitting the preapproved
formula-a formula at odds with objectives like open-space
preservation, for example.
2. Even if Mezzanine Finance Does Escalate CertainModes of
Development, Why Design FinanceRules in Orderto Alter Effects of
Transactions? And by What Logic Is EnvironmentalImpact a
Mezzanine Lending Issue?
A recent discussion paper published by Resources for the Futurel36
reports economists' findings in a study of lot sizes, zoning, and
household preferences. 1 3 7 The authors report, "To the extent that
communities want to slow the rate of growth of land used in
development, and promote smart growth policies, there will need to
be a move toward higher density." 3 8 The economists' findings
indicate that zoning is not an effective tool for achieving higherdensity housing. 139 "An important contributor to this fact," they
.observe, "may be that people have preferences for space and larger
lots. This remains a difficult challenge for achieving smart growth

outcomes." 1 4 0
Numerous studies have documented a trend in recent decades
toward larger home sizes, which are occupied by families of fewer
people.141 Mortgage securitization and the introduction of new

136 Resources for the Future is a nonpartisan, nonprofit environmental research group.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.rff.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
137 KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100.
138 Id. at 21.
139 Id
140 Id
141See, e.g., HAYDEN, supra note 2; KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100.
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residential home mortgage products in recent years expanded
accessibility to larger houses for many buyers.142 At the same time,
mezzanine financing and the securitization of mezzanine loan
portfolios have contributed to real estate developers' capacity to build
new homes in tandem with increased demand.
People want new homes and, apparently, low-density housing. 14 3
The prevailing view is that while shoddy due diligence on the part of
financers is bad, there is nothing bad about growth itself or
speculation per se, or the underlying transactional structures with
which we finance them. Mezzanine finance simply maximizes access
to capital for developers, which can lead to more housing that is
available at lower costs to buyers (where developers pass savings in
costs of capital through to buyers).
While mezzanine finance greases144 practices that many say
aggravate environmental problems, this mode of finance could just as
readily fund "smart growth" or the construction of environmentally
progressive communities.14 5 As John Steinbeck asks in The Grapes

142 See ZYWICKI, supra note 12 (discussing the proliferation of high-income, subprime

borrowers, and their impact on the foreclosure crisis).
143 The idea that mezzanine finance merely accomplishes fulfillment of consumer
preferences sidesteps important questions about these preferences. Doug Kysar notes that
the political community can be "tempted by the notion that its regulations and policy
pronouncements can simply trace individual preferences, without also endogenously
affecting them." DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 17 (2010). We cannot conclude that current

patterns of development are good because they reflect consumer preferences; these
preferences themselves will change with the landscape they transform using currently
available tools and policies. The disappearance of open space itself will change our
Recent scholarship discusses how the
culture, expectations, and preferences.
environmental movement must transform in the face of disappearance of places untouched
by humans. See PAUL WAPNER, LIVING THROUGH THE END OF NATURE: THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 210 (2010) (arguing that, given impending

disappearance of nature or wilderness, neither the dream of naturalism nor the dream of
mastery over nature can survive, leaving a breached boundary between humans and nature
that requires a new coevolutionary path).
144 The use of chemicals as metaphor-grease, fuel, friction eliminators-is deliberate,
as environmental law has an established history of approving chemicals for use in some
contexts but not others. Chemicals that are useful and important for some places and
processes are lethal in others.
145 A range of such communities has cropped up in recent years. See, e.g., Jason
Blevins, "Agriburbia" Sprouts on Colorado's Front Range, DENV. POST, Oct. 24, 2009,

http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13631048 (describing the practice of allocating some lots
in a subdivision for growing vegetables and other plants). Though interesting, these
examples are relatively small-scale anomalies to standard development patterns.
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of Wrath (and Barnes excerpts in his critique of UCC Article 9): "Is a
tractor bad? Is the power that turns the long furrows wrong?"146
Obviously there are many factors other than commercial finance
that shape and fuel the phenomenon of suburbanization and its
complex implications: tax subsidies for home mortgages, zoning and
local government objectives, and highway infrastructure, to name a
few. Mezzanine lending may appear, compared to these factors, like
a behind-the-scenes detail. Any real collective action to address
issues that suburbanization presents should take place in the public
fora for addressing zoning and regulation. Mezzanine lenders and
borrowers are just squirrels getting their nuts from a pattern of
development that results from larger forces. If certain kinds of
development are in fact undesirable, they should be taxed.
Yet, as difficult, collective issues surrounding sprawling
development simmer in public discourse, mezzanine lending makes it
possible for real estate developers to maximize the pace of building.
It is not clear what the best approach to land use is. Communities
deliberate over complex, multifaceted goals, such as desire to have
open space and desire to have new neighborhoods to support the tax
base and to attract new residents. These deliberations may not be
resolvable using cost-benefit concepts. They invoke deep challenges
surrounding the coexistence of a love of nature and a tolerance of
loss.147
Even dramatically increased consumer commitment to
conservation may not curtail environmentally problematic growth
patterns because even the most evolved environmentalist ethic
encounters the paradox that people at the same time love the natural

146 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 151 (Penguin Books 1999) (1939);
Barnes, supra note 20, at 458. There is an instrumentalist aesthetic at play in commercial
law-an aesthetic in which law has the properties of a physical object. The notion that law
is a tool implies that law has a utility detached from cultural or ideological commitments.
See Hughes, supra note 20, at 723-29. This thinking builds on Annalise Riles's
observation that "[tihe principal insight of Realism was that law was best imagined
metaphoricallyas a tool," but at some point in the twentieth century "the idea that law was
like a tool quite literally became a tool of its own." Riles, supra note 53, at 980-81
(discussing aesthetic dimensions of technocratic approaches to law). In the commercial
law context, the idea that commercial law is a tool has become a tool of its own. The
metaphor of commercial law as a tool is itself a tool useful for emphasizing commercial
law's neutrality with respect to the effects of the transactions it governs.
147 See NICHOLSEN, supranote 3.

2011l]

Securitizationand Suburbia

409

environment and feel indifferent toward its destruction. 14 8 A choice
by a consumer to buy a house with a large carbon footprint in a
previously undeveloped area despite knowledge of and concern for
environmental impact is not a simple expression of preference that
public policy should ratify. 149
We could say that environmental consequences of suburban sprawl
are a commercial finance problem because securitized mezzanine
lending enables real estate development to outpace the process by
which communities should make decisions about growth.
Commercial finance laws create an appetizing buffet of opportunities
to profit from developing land into new residential subdivisions.
While communities, institutions, and individuals struggle with the
value and meaning of open space, transactional structures designed to
maximize access to capital for certain types of development enable a
fast pace of land consumption.
New low-density housing has been (and will be) in demand. The
benefits and costs associated with it are complex to assess; the
normative values that give structure to cost-benefit analyses of real
estate development require ongoing, collective determination.' 5 0
Suburbanization of open space raises controversies that

148 Environmentalists and psychoanalysts have explored this paradox and its effects on
behavior concerning the environment. See, e.g., NICHOLSEN, supra note 3; HAROLD F.
SEARLES, Unconscious Processes in Relation to the Environmental Crisis, in
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 228, 229 (1979) (contending that we

are hampered in meeting the environmental crisis by a severe and pervasive apathy which
is based largely upon feelings of which we are unconscious); GARY SNYDER, THE
PRACTICE OF THE WLD (1990) (exploring the depth and complexity of our relationship to
the wild).
149 A 2005 study assessing public discourse about sprawl found high levels of concern
about environmental impact and increases in traffic; yet, sprawling development has not
abated. See David N. Bengston et al., An Analysis ofPublic Discourse on Urban Sprawl
in the United States: Monitoring Concern About Major Threats to Forests, 7 FOREST
POL'Y & ECON. 745, 745-56 (2005) (assessing computer content analysis of media and

public reports on sprawl and finding increasing levels of concern for loss of open space
and other environmental impacts of sprawl). Some scholars attribute this to the "power of
the American dream." See, e.g., Mark S. Davies, Understanding Sprawl: Lessons from
Architecturefor Legal Scholars, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1520, 1525 (2001) (reviewing ANDRS
DUANY ET AL., supra note 7). Other scholars have explored the ways in which consumer

preferences and choices relate to identity formation and expression.

See LIZABETH

COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR
AMERICA (2003).
150 Cf Kysar, supra note 20 (discussing how cost-benefit analyses animate underlying

values and arguing for ecological economics or cost-benefit analyses that incorporate
limits on the natural environment's capacity to sustain growth).
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environmental regulation strugles to address, such as, for example,
loss of large predator habitat. s Low-density development is not
necessarily containable through zoning.152 Disagreement, conflict,
hopes, and aspirations surround this type of development. 15 3
As long as it is a good bet that homes of a certain size will sell at a
certain price point in a given location, mezzanine lending expands
access to capital for developers to place the bet. Not all of these bets
need to be successful. In this way, securitized mezzanine finance can
enable developers to engage in "premature or unnecessary conversion
of open-space land for urban uses."1 54 They can begin clearing off
habitats, grading roads over fields, and the like, in anticipation of
success. But if it looks like the bet is not a good one, developers can
If the
cease construction or leave houses sitting partially built.'
relevant project company defaults on loans, then the mortgagee
recovers the value of the land. Dealing with whatever value is left in
the project is the mezzanine lender's problem.15 6 The mezzanine
lender, in turn, has often transferred this risk to others by securitizing
its mezzanine loan portfolio.
One might say that if mezzanine finance were no longer available
at the lowest possible cost, then developers would simply use junior
mortgages to leverage their projects. This may be true, but junior

151Large predators such as bears and wolves require long corridors over which to
travel. They cover too much ground to coexist with people in a landscape divided up by
development. The protection of specific areas in the forms of public parks and preserves
is not adequate to accommodate these animals. See REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE
COSTS OF SPRAWL: ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS AT THE URBAN FRINGE 142 (1974); Robert W.
Burchell, Economic and FiscalCosts (andBenefits) ofSprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 159, 168-69
(1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity andLand, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997).
152 See KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100; see also sources cited supra note 95.

153 Cf MIT Press, Back cover, to ELIZABETH FARRELLY, BLUBBERLAND: THE
DANGERS OF HAPPINESS (2008) (assessing consumption, its eco-footprint, and a state of
mind in which we expect to be happy, but in fact grow less happy and yet do not abandon
habits we know to be both psychologically and ecologically destructive). "[Q]uadruplegaraged mansions, vast malls, [and] gated communities" are among the consumer-driven
developments that Farrelly discusses. Id.
154 CAL. GOV'T CODE

§ 65561

(West 2010).

155 Securitized mezzanine loans-and the commercial laws that enable them-facilitate
development that can create devastating environmental costs without always creating
whatever value is associated with new housing. For example, developers may prepare
land for development by constructing graded roads and clearing off trees but then delay or
abandon plans for actual home building. See HAYDEN, supra note 7, at 18-19.
156 See supra text accompanying note 115.
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mortgages do not create the same degree of leverage that mezzanine
loans do. If junior mortgages are like spraying some WD-40 on the
gears of building developments, mezzanine finance is like treating
development with an advanced, friction-eliminating chemical.
The details of securitized mezzanine finance may seem ancillary in
relation to forces like, for example, federal subsidies for automobile
dependency and residential mortgage financing. Yet focusing on real
estate finance practices could enable greater sensitivity to the pace
and desirability of suburban developments. So long as suburban
sprawl remains a controversial topic, perhaps commercial finance
rules should not maximize opportunities for leverage that can
accelerate development beyond the pace of important collective
decisions about land use and the built environment.

